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The Disempowering Relationship
Between Mediator Neutrality
and Judicial Impartiality:
Toward a New Mediation Ethic
Ronit Zamir
I. INTRODUCTION
The neutrality of the mediator has always been the constitutive idea
informing the ideology of mediation. It is considered a necessary condition
not only for conducting proper mediation but also for the very existence of
the process called mediation. The absence of neutrality undercuts the
foundations of mediation, so that it is no longer mediation but some other
process altogether. "Non-neutral mediator," therefore, is an oxymoron.'
In various laws, mediators' ethical codes, and in the mediation
literature,4 the term "neutral" appears as the heading for the titles of a third
party that assists in resolving disputes. This use of the term points to the fact
that the neutrality of the mediator not only manifests an aspiration for proper
professional practice, it also establishes everyone who practices mediation as
possessing the quality of neutrality.5
In consequence of this perception, neutrality received the status of self-
evident. It is no wonder, then, that over the course of the past two decades
only a few studies have been published that deal with the subject. Its neutral
status generally camouflages the need for discussion and analysis.' This is
1. See SIMON ROBERTS & MICHAEL PALMER, DISPUTE PROCESSES 153-54 (2005); Christine
E. Harrington & Sally Engle Merry, Ideological Production: The Making of Community Mediation,
22 LAW AND SoC'y REv. 709, 729 (1988).
2. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 573 (1996); 28 U.S.C. § 653 (1998).
3. See, e.g., MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (2005), available at
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/documents/modelstandardsconductapril2007.pdf.
4. See, e.g., STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, FRANK E.A. SANDER & NANCY H. ROGERS, DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 3 (1992).
5. Janet Rifkin, Jonathan Millen & Sara Cobb, Toward a New Discourse for Mediation: A
Critique of)Neutrality, 9 MEDIATION Q. 151, 151-52 (1991).
6. Id.
467
1
Zamir: The Disempowering Relationship Between Mediator Neutrality and Ju
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2011
the reason that empirical studies on mediation do not document the practice
of neutrality or view it as a concept in need of deconstruction and
elucidation but view it as an empirical fact requiring measurement and
nothing more. The diagnosis of the mediator's neutrality usually amounts to
the subjective judgment of the parties.'
It is my contention that the taken-for-granted status of neutrality is to a
great extent a direct outcome of its proximity to the idea of judicial
impartiality: the mediator, like the judge, bears the obligation of impartiality
and is obliged to maintain an equal distance from the parties involved.
Some scholars argue that the notion of mediator neutrality provides a
legitimizing framework in aligning mediators with judges.8 The issue I shall
discuss in this article is whether the concept of mediator neutrality advances
the empowering and effective participation of parties from disadvantaged
groups.
The next section will deal with the relationship between the concept of
neutrality in the adversarial legal process, in the mediation process, and the
concept of procedural justice. I shall then present the meanings ascribed to
the concept of mediator neutrality in the two prevailing models of mediation:
the problem-solving model and the transformative model. The affinity
between these meanings and the concept of judicial impartiality will be
discussed and critiqued. Finally, I shall suggest an alternative mediation
ethic to neutrality that, in my opinion, may well increase the chances of
furthering empowered participation among disadvantaged groups. The last
part of the article will present the narrative mediation model and examine
the mediation ethic on which it is based.
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE THIRD PARTY'S NEUTRALITY AND
THE PRINCIPLES OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
A. Introduction: The Opposition Between Mediation and Law
The concept of empowerment has long played a crucial role in
establishing the standing of mediation as a process that has the potential to
provide alternative justice to that offered by the formal law of the state.
Since its appearance in North America in the mid-1970s, its proponents have
described it as a fairer alternative than law in general and litigation in
7. Sara Cobb & Janet Rifkin, Practice and Paradox: Deconstructing Neutrality in Mediation,
16 LAW& SOC. INQUIRY 35,37 (1991).
8. Kathy Douglas & Rachel Field, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Providing Some Answers to
Neutrality Dilemma in Court-Connected Mediation, in 3RD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: TRANSFORMING LEGAL PROCESSES IN COURT AND BEYOND 67
(Greg Reinhardt & Andrew Cannon eds., 2007).
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particular.9 The alternative vision offered by mediation speaks about novel
forms of justice, different from traditional ways through which law and
justice are claimed to come together. This form of alternative justice
expresses dissatisfaction with legal reforms that fall short of their promise to
ameliorate social and economic inequality; it offers, instead, a vision of self-
sustaining individuals who acquire the tools and skills to shape their own
lives. The underlying assumption of mediation is that at least some
individuals in given communities, although not having a claim to any
specific expertise, nonetheless possess the ability to solve their own disputes
without recourse to the courts of the state. This new form of justice has been
described as being of a higher quality than traditional legal justice because it
is sensitive to ethnic, cultural, racial, and gender differences, as well as to
the impact of sentiments and emotions on the evolution of disputes and the
ability to settle them.
Mediation is generally presented in the professional literature in
opposition to the legal process in regard to three principal aspects.
1. Parties' Control of the Process
In contrast to the legal process, in which the parties are represented by a
lawyer-an expert in legal language'-the parties in mediation are in
control of both the process and the outcome. Their control is manifested in
the manner of their participation. Unlike the formal legal process, mediation
is a flexible process, without hardened rules and procedures. It enables the
parties to "tell the story" in their own, everyday language." The control of
the process leads to control of the outcome: the parties are active participants
in shaping a solution to their dispute instead of mere passive spectators of
their lawyers who take center stage.12  The solution is agreed on, and
authority for the decision is left in the hands of the parties instead of being
entrusted to a third party, a judge. The process is voluntary; each party can
9. See generally LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE:
CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES (1987) (discussing how consensus-
building approaches such as negotiation and mediation can be more effective than litigation).
10. Susan Silbey & Austin Sarat, Dispute Processing in Law and Legal Scholarship: From
Institutional Critique to the Reconstruction of the Judicial Subject, 66 DENV. U. L. REV. 437, 483
(1989).
11. JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O'BARR, JUST WORDS: LAW, LANGUAGE, AND POWER
39, 42 (1998); Christine Harrington, The Politics of Participation and Nonparticipation in Dispute
Processes, 6 LAW & POL'Y 203, 209 (1984).
12. JEROLD AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 10 (1983).
469
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walk out at any time without any explanation or reason and without any
sanction being levied, 3 in contrast to the obligatory nature of the legal
process, which does not allow unilateral departure.
2. Neutral Mediator and the Absence of a Decisive Authority
The autonomy of the parties and the high level of their control of the
process and of the outcome necessitates that the mediator's power be limited
and that there be no authority to decide the dispute.' 4 The mediator is, then,
the neutral third party, whose task is limited to assisting the parties to
conduct negotiations between themselves. Even though the mediator
generally presents herself as an expert in dispute resolution, this expertise is
manifested in the ability to conduct the process eye-to-eye, so to speak, to
create open and fair communication with the parties and between the parties,
to acquire their trust, and to aid them to identify their needs and interests.
This is unlike the legal process, in which the judge, whose position is above
that of the parties, not at eye level, decides the conflict on the basis of legal
rules.
3. A Solution Responding to the Needs of the Parties
In contrast to formal adjudication, in which a solution to the dispute is
arrived at by means of classifying the problem into categories having
objective and universal validity, mediation is intended to solve the specific
problem that exists between specific parties. The dispute is not solved by
applying a general norm, but the parties themselves are the ones that create
the relevant norms and tailor their suit" with the aid of the mediator. The
particularistic norms offer a creative response to the parties' special needs16
and are not necessarily based on legal rights.' 7 Resolving the dispute by way
of talking with each other and offering an answer to the special needs of
13. Edward Kruk, Mediation and Conflict Resolution in Social Work and the Human Services:
Issues, Debates, and Trends, in MEDIATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN SOCIAL WORK AND THE
HUMAN SERVICES 1, 5 (Edward Kruk ed., 1997).
14. CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR
RESOLVING CONFLICT 50-53 (1996); Isabelle R. Gunning, Diversity Issues in Mediation:
Controlling Negative Cultural Myths, 1995 J. DisP. RESOL. 55, 56.
15. Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 327-28
(1971); Richard Delgado, ADR and the Dispossessed: Recent Books About the Deformalization
Movement, 13 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 145, 146 (1988); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and Fathers
ofInvention: The Intellectual Founders ofADR, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 16-17 (2000).
16. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of
Problem Solving 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 804-09 (1984).
17. MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 25-26 (1981).
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each side enables a continuation of relations and communication between
them, instead of breaking off connection and separation, which are by-
products of an enforced hierarchical decision. 8 Special needs might include
emotional needs, 9 which are not recognized in law as worthy of a response.
B. Between Procedural Justice and Empowerment
The idea of controlling the process expresses a perception of procedural
justice whereby having control over the procedural aspects of dispute
resolution constitutes a fair procedure that paves the way to a just result.20
This perception has support in empirical studies conducted by Thibaut and
Walker in the 1970s that found a direct relationship between the degree of
the parties' control of the process and their sense of the fairness of the
process and the result.21 According to these studies, the greater the sense of
control that the litigants experience over the procedural aspects related to a
settlement of the dispute, such as presenting arguments and evidence, the
more they evaluate the result as fair, even if it was not the result for which
they had hoped.22 The explanation Thibaut and Walker give to these
findings is that controlling the process is experienced by the participants as
indirect control of the result.23
Studies in the 1980s and 1990s found that control of the process has
importance in and of itself, even without any direct affinity to the possibility
of controlling the outcome.24 For example, it was found that parties who
received an opportunity to fashion the rules of the procedure themselves
experienced a significantly high sense of fairness of the process and the
outcome.25 Another study, which investigated subjective perceptions
relating to reasons for obeying the law, found that the legitimacy of the law
to dictate behavior stemmed not only from its deterrent element but also
18. CONLEY & O'BARR, supra note 11, at 41, 48.
19. MOORE, supra note 14, at 162-69.
20. For the concept of procedural justice, see ALAN LIND & TOM TYLER, THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988) and RITA C. MANNINO & RENE TRUILLO, SOCIAL
JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY (1996).
21. JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1975).
22. Id.
23. John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CAL. L. REv. 541, 546-47
(1978).
24. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 116-17 (1990).
25. Tom R. Tyler, Justice and Power in Civil Dispute Processing, in JUSTICE AND POWER IN
SOCIO-LEGAL STUDIES 323 (Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat eds., 1997).
471
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from the importance that people attributed to a just result that is obtained in
a fair procedure. 2 6 It also found that the more the decision-making process is
experienced as fair, the more the outcome is perceived as just; and the
feeling of the commitment to uphold it increases even among those whom
the decision did not favor.27 Still another finding was that obtaining the
chance to speak is perceived as having an importance of its own, without
connection to the issue of whether one's case did impact the outcome.28
According to Tyler, receiving the opportunity to speak and present one's
argument before an authoritative party, like a judge, increases the speaker's
sense of self-value.29 Support for this explanation may be found in a later
study that showed that an attitude of politeness and respect on the part of the
authority created the feeling that the process was fair.3
All of these findings might show that mediation is a process embodying
principles of procedural justice to a significant extent, for the degree of
control that it imparts to the parties surpasses that of the adversarial process
and covers every dimension of the process. Indeed, various studies have
found that a method that is flexible and informal, characterized by tailored
rules of procedure, self-defined subjects for the agenda, and self-
responsibility for the dispute and settlement to the parties, intensifies the
parties' sense of fairness of the procedure and its outcome.31 Various
scholars have argued that a high level of control of the process and its result
creates greater procedural justice 32 and increases the chances that the parties
to mediation will experience empowerment.
According to this conception, empowerment of the parties is an inherent
product of their participation in a process that embodies principles of
procedural justice. The empowering potential of controlling the process may
be realized by developing dispute-settlement skills; establishing relations of
mutual respect, trust, and understanding; and improving the sense of self-
value.34  This conception is based on the premise that when free and
conscious choice is effected by autonomous individuals who are capable of
identifying their own needs and of agreeing to a solution that responds to
26. TYLER, supra note 24, at 117, 150.
27. Id. at 150.
28. Id. at 104.
29. Id. at 147.
30. Tyler, supra note 25, at 326-27.
31. Harrington, supra note 11, at 211-12; Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Small
Claims Mediation in Maine: An Empirical Assessment, 33 ME. L. REv. 237, 257 (1981).
32. Tyler, supra note 25; LIND & TYLER, supra note 20, at 121-22.
33. Robert A. Baruch Bush, Efficiency and Protection or Empowerment and Recognition?
The Mediator's Role and Ethical Standards in Mediation, 41 FLA. L. REv. 253, 267 (1989).
34. Id. at 267-68; Fuller, supra note 15, at 325-27.
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these needs, this increases their ability to act as agents." A mediator who
wants to further empowerment in mediation is obliged, then, to leave as high
a level of control as possible in the hands of the parties and to encourage
them to put into effect autonomy, choice, and self-determination.
In the following sections, I will examine the extent to which the
perception of neutrality advances principles of procedural justice. First, I
will present the concept of judicial impartiality and examine the reciprocal
relations between it and the idea of the parties' control of the process.
C. Judicial Impartiality
"We may try to see things as objectively as we please. None the less, we
can never see them with any eyes except our own.
- Benjamin Cardozo36
The notion of judicial impartiality is considered the breath of life of
adjudication, a sine qua non for conducting a fair procedure and attaining a
just outcome. Impartiality not only manifests an aspiration for proper
judicial practice, it also is thought to be a supreme judicial virtue38 that is
vital not only to assuring the fairness of the particular process but also to
guaranteeing the public's trust in the judicial system in general.
In the adversarial legal process, the concept of judicial impartiality is
intended to assure fulfillment of the central characteristic of the adversarial
process; namely, entrusting control of managing the process to the litigants
and their lawyers. In effect, it may be said that judicial impartiality and the
parties' control of the process are two sides of the same coin. Without
judicial impartiality, there is concern that control of the process will be
withdrawn from the litigants and be transferred to the judge. On the other
side of this coin, the litigants' control of the process advances the idea of
35. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 15, at 22; CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW, DISPUTE PROCESSING
AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION-THEORY, PRACTICE AND POLICY xvii (2003).
36. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 13 (1921).
37. Lord Devlin, Judges and Lawmakers, 39 MOD. L. REv. 1, 3-4 (1976).
38. Id. at 4.
39. MiHUAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORrrY-A COMPARATIVE
APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 135 (1986); Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Impartial Judge:
Detachment or Passion?, 45 DEPAUL L. REv. 605 (1996); Murray Gleeson, Public Confidence in the
Judiciary, 76 AUST. L.J. 558 (2002).
473
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judicial impartiality and is perceived as a guarantor of its fulfillment.40 With
the litigants as the main players, the judge is able to remain in a relatively
passive position where the judge's principal function is to administer a
process that allows equal competition between the litigants. Placing the ball
in the hands of the parties themselves gives them complete responsibility for
their success in winning the adversarial competition. Specifically, each
party needs to make the utmost effort to present a convincing story to the
court. In other words, each must present a narrative that contains a more
faithful version of past events. Each party must convince the court that their
narrative is the real story and that the other party's story never happened or
is not reasonable. Each party also needs to give suitable legal dress to their
respective factual version. A litigant who tells a story whose inherent
qualities are objectively more convincing will be the one to win the
competition.
Judicial impartiality has two dimensions: procedural and substantive.
At the procedural stage of the legal process, the principle of impartiality
contains two principal aspects: maintaining equal distance from the parties
and the judge's absence of interest in any one of the parties or in the
outcome of the dispute.
Maintaining equal distance is manifested in the structure of an
equilateral triangle or triad.41 The triangular structure demonstrates an equal
distance between the judge, who sits at the vertex, and both of the parties.
On the surface, equal distance can be maintained by both passive behavior
and active, involved behavior. However, the commonly accepted meaning
of the obligation is low judicial involvement and not taking a position in the
dispute, which presumably assures that control of the competitive game will
remain in the hands of the parties themselves.42 The triangular structure is
vital for guaranteeing the legitimacy of the judicial decision in the eyes of
the parties and in the eyes of the public at large. The decision of a judge
who abandons the triangular structure and creates a coalition of two against
one will be perceived as illegitimate.43
The necessity of maintaining equal distance creates another obligation:
the judge must not have any interest in any of the parties or in the outcome
of the dispute. Such interest can prevent the judge from displaying an equal
measure of openness toward the arguments of each party, which might then
40. See DAMASKA, supra note 39, at 136.
41. See MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLMCAL ANALYSIS 1-2 (1986).
42. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353, 383 (1978).
43. SHAPIRO, supra note 41, at 22-26.
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undermine the triad and create a real concern of partiality in conducting the
trial."
In the pure adversarial model, the two meanings of judicial impartiality
facilitate a mental and emotional condition of tabula rasa. The ideal of a
clean slate means, first and foremost, a stance of ignorance in relation to the
facts. In the adversarial system, all the facts need to undergo filtering
through a competitive process of proof even if some of these facts are
already known. 45 Reliance on information that has not been filtered might
harm the reliability of the fact-determination process and make it difficult
for the judge to weigh the evidence objectively. Thus stems the requirement
to base the judicial decision only on the facts of the specific case as proved
by the parties and not on facts not introduced in evidence.46
It is incumbent on the judge generally to practice a tabula rasa norm not
only in relation to the facts but also as to the legal situation. Except for
cases in which the legal situation is simple and clear, the judge must be
devoid of any prior legal stance in regard to the case so that the litigants'
means of convincing may bear fruit and influence the decision.4 7 It follows
that the judge must refrain from raising arguments at her own initiative that
have not been argued by the litigants and she must be careful to give
justifiable grounds for the decision so that the litigants may realize that their
participation did indeed influence the result and that their arguments were
taken into consideration.48
At the substantive stage of the adversarial legal process-the judicial
decision stage-the principle of impartiality takes on another meaning:
objectivity. 49 The objective decision is one based on legal rules, in contrast
44. Shaman, supra note 39, at 620; Keith Mason, Unconscious Judicial Prejudice, 75 AUST.
L.J. 676 (2001). The disqualification test according to Israeli law is the test of a "real concern" of
partiality. Courts Law [consolidated version], 5744-1984, 38 LSI 271 (1984) (Isr.). The Israeli
Supreme Court held that the real concern test is an objective test, according to which a decision must
be made on the basis of the entirety of external circumstances whether a reasonable judge can
continue to judge the matter. See Yedid v. State of Israel P.D. 29 (2) 375 [1975] (Isr.). This differs
from the "appearance of partiality" test, which is an examination of the impression created in the
public at large or the assumed reaction of the reasonable person, and is the accepted test in Anglo-
American courts. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3.E. 1 (2007).
45. DAMASKA, supra note 39, at 138-39.
46. Id.
47. Id
48. See Fuller, supra note 42, at 388.
49. See Shaman, supra note 39, at 606-07.
475
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to subjective perceptions and opinions.50 Legal rules are considered a source
of universal validity that supplies the legal decision with its required
objective basis. These rules are comprehended as a coherent system, as
closed, and as having a distinct rationale of its own, within which one may
find the answers to all the questions relating to the social reality.s' The
subjective perceptions and beliefs of the judge are not considered part of the
legal body of knowledge, and therefore bringing them to bear is thought to
be dangerous because it might sacrifice the appearance of impartiality that
only exists when the judge takes pains to act according to the guidelines of
the legal rules.
The image that relates to the process of an objective decision is that of
the goddess of justice, whose eyes are covered so that even the sight of the
litigants will not influence her so that she will be partial toward one of them.
The image of the goddess of justice demonstrates the concept of a "veil of
ignorance" as defined by Rawls:13 it is incumbent on the judge-like the
goddess of justice-to place himself behind a veil of ignorance to be able to
ignore the differences between the litigants and to make an objective
ruling.54 Impartiality is connected with demonstrating an identical relation
toward everyone involved in the given situation. Placing oneself behind a
veil of ignorance is intended to make the identity of the litigants and even
that of the judge irrelevant to the decision. In other words, even though at
this stage the judge can no longer be neutral in the sense of not taking a
stand in the dispute-which was of central significance at the procedural
stage of the process-relying on legal rules with their objective and
universal validity enables the judge to add and preserve a stance of
impartiality; for the decision-despite its involving someone who won and
someone who lost-is based on exogenous rules with an independent
existence that dictate the result to the judge.
50. See id; Devlin, supra note 37, at 4.
51. Cf Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J.
1 (1984) (arguing that nihilism makes judicial impartiality virtually impossible).
52. See Devlin, supra note 37, at 4; AHARON BARAK, INTERPRETATION IN LAW Vol. 2, 659
(1993) [Heb]; Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a
Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REv. 19, 25 (2003) (discussing the role of time and place in judicial
determinations).
53. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 (2005).
54. YOTAM BENZIMAN, UNTIL You ARE IN His PLACE-ETHICS, IMPARTIALITY, AND
PERSONAL RELATIONS (1995) [Heb.].
55. Id.
56. Id. at 87.
57. See Arthur S. Miller & Ronald F. Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional
Adjudication, 27 CHI. L. REV. 661, 663 (1960); Robert Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary
Genre, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 201, 205-09 (1990) (noting that judges frequently employ monologue
476
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The procedural aspect and the substantive aspect of judicial impartiality
maintain reciprocity of mutual dependence. On the one hand, a process
conducted by a judge devoid of favoritism who keeps an equal distance from
both parties and enables them to compete equally and to have an equal
opportunity to argue their respective cases is considered a sine qua non for
reaching an objective legal result. In other words, it is insufficient that the
decision be based on legal rules; rather, it must also take into consideration
the arguments of the two parties so that the participation of one of them does
not become worthless. On the other hand, without an objective decision
that relies on legal rules, the result will appear arbitrary even if a judge who
showed no favoritism, who maintained equal distance from the parties, and
who gave them an equal chance to present their arguments, conducts the
process.
Thus the importance of separating process from content or procedure
from substance is the trickling down of the outcome stage into the
procedural stage. For instance, if the judge expresses an opinion as to the
more believable version or the desired outcome, this might harm the equal
competition between the parties and create the feeling that the court has
already passed judgment before being supplied with all the evidence and
arguments.59
However, these two aspects of judicial impartiality have received their
share of criticism. One critique pertains to the theoretical separation of the
procedural stage of the adversarial process from that of the result or
decision. The essence of this criticism is that such a separation does not
exist in actuality. In fact, an examination of the performance of the
adversarial process shows that it assimilates discursive practices that import
the outcome stage into the procedural stage.60 These practices determine the
structure and content of a successful story and begin to shape, while still in
the procedural stage, the outcome of the process, while blurring the
boundary between process and outcome. In general, they normalize and
regiment the stories of the parties, thereby detracting from the parties'
effective participation. The trickling down of the outcome into the
procedural stage also takes place by exercising practices contrary to the
voice to indicate to the reader that he or she is making a compelled decision based on legal
precedent).
58. See Fuller, supra note 42, at 388.
59. Id.
60. CONLEY & O'BARR, supra note 11, at 90; JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O'BARR,
RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS: THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE 58 (1990).
477
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adversarial participatory ideal, such as the practice of judicial settlement.
Various scholars argue that a settlement offered by a judge at an early stage
of the proceedings, even before all the evidence and arguments have been
heard, harms competitive participation and may create in the parties a
feeling that the judge has already formulated an opinion on the desired
outcome.6 '
Another criticism that has been lodged regarding the principle of
impartiality and objectivity originated with Legal Realism and continued
with the Critical Legal Studies Movement and the Feminist Movement. 62
The Realists were the first to shake the trust in relating to law as a closed
system of rules. 63 They argued that the legal body of knowledge does not
constitute a final and closed system and that it cannot supply final answers to
all questions.64 Even the formalist assumption of the existence of an
autonomous and rational legal logic-by means of which experts apply the
legal doctrine of concrete cases-has come in for withering criticism: it was
argued that judicial objectivity is nothing but a myth, the function of which
is to mask the influence of the judge's particularistic viewpoint on her
decisions.s
The Critical Legal Studies Movement's criticism focuses on the
reciprocal relations between the dominant culture and prevailing conceptions
on the one hand, and the power transmitted to courts to interpret the law on
the other. According to this criticism, the myth of the judge as "observing
without a perspective"67 serves the court to exert cultural control and create
the social world by naming it:" the court is authorized to declare rights and
to define injustices; to constitute meaning to everyday events; and to supply
a system of categories and frameworks through which the world can be
61. Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 385 (1982); Judith Resnik, On
the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877
(1988).
62. David M. Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN.
L. REV. 575, 578 (1984); Shaman, supra note 39, at 626.
63. Trubek, supra note 62, at 578.
64. Id.
65. CARDOZO, supra note 36, at 11-12; Shaman, supra note 39, at 615-16; Charles B. Clark &
David M. Trubek, The Creative Role of the Judge and Freedom in the Common Law Tradition, 71
YALE L.J. 255, 263-66 (1961); JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).
66. Shaman, supra note 39, at 626; Mason, supra note 44, at 656; Edward G. White, The
Inevitability of Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 649, 651-53 (1984).
67. CRAIG CALHOUN, CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY: CULTURE, HISTORY, AND THE CHALLENGE
OF DIFFERENCE 187 (1995).
68. SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS
AMONG WORKING CLASS AMERICANS 8-9 (1990); see also Barbara Yngvesson, Inventing Law in
Local Settings: Rethinking Popular Legal Culture, 98 YALE L.J. 1689, 1691 (1989).
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interpreted and the cultural meaning of fairness, justice, and morality
shaped. The means of constituting a meaning is hegemonic: the system of
beliefs of the cultural elite, with which the judge is generally counted, is
presented as necessary and objective, when in actuality it is often arbitrary
and subjective. In this way, the system's belligerent nature is camouflaged
69and receives legitimacy.W
Feminist jurists such as Catherine MacKinnon and Martha Minow7 o
continued this criticism, arguing that liberal law reflects and reproduces
patriarchal values.7 ' They claim that the process in which the court
classifies the problem brought before it into legal categories is arbitrary and
structured as a logical pathway leading to the one truth, leaving the legal
category transparent and taken for granted.72 The arbitrary nature of the
classification process lies in the fact that classification is generally done by
choosing another characteristic, such as handicapped or motherhood, to
represent the gamut of a person's or a group's identity. In consequence,
the category obtains the power to determine the characteristics of the person
or group slotted into it and to turn them into a kind of status.74 Variance is
presented as intrinsic to the person or group when it is in effect nothing but a
product of changeable social perceptions.
The perception of the neutrality of the mediator is influenced to a great
extent by the two aspects of the concept of judicial impartiality. I will
expand on this issue in the next section.
D. The Neutrality of the Mediator
1. Introduction: The Hybrid Nature of Mediation Participation
Despite the theoretical proximity between the mediator's neutrality and
judicial impartiality, the two concepts differ in two central aspects. First, a
judge is not authorized to meet separately with one of the parties because it
69. See Yngvesson, supra note 68, at 1691; MERRY, supra note 68, at 7-10.
70. CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 109 (1989);
Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987).
71. Minow, supra note 70, at 16.
72. Id. at 34-36; ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 44
(2000).
73. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 72, at 43-44.
74. Minow, supra note 70, at 34.
75. Id. at 49-50.
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is considered harmful to equal competition and might create a real concern
of partiality-or at least the appearance of favoritism. 76  In contrast, the
mediator is not only allowed to meet with each party individually as he
deems necessary, but such separate meetings serve as the heart of the
process of identifying the needs and interests to be mediated and is tied to
building rapport between the mediator and the parties." Second, the
mediator, unlike the judge, is not authorized to decide a dispute. The
mediation, characterized by quasi-democratic aspects, aspires to intensify
the degree of control allowed the parties and to leave in their hands
exclusive control of the outcome.79
The foregoing differences between the neutrality of the mediator and
judicial impartiality emanate, in my opinion, from the hybrid nature of
mediation participation, which combines democratic principles with
principles of adversarial competition. The import of the principle of
impartiality from the adversarial process is meant to enable the mediator to
be an equal distance from the disputing parties and to maintain the fairness
of the proceedings, whereas the relations of trust that the mediator forms
with the parties, mainly in the course of caucusing, enables the mediator to
help them cooperate and to lead them to an agreement on an outcome that
satisfies their needs and interests. The combination of impartiality and trust
is meant to enable the mediator to conduct a quasi-democratic process that
leaves sovereignty over the process and the outcome in the hands of the
parties, while maintaining the triad structure that is obligated by the
adversarial competition between the parties.
The mediation literature deals generally with two models: the problem-
solving model (which is the more frequent of the two) and the
transformative model. The two models differ from each other first and
foremost in the goal of mediation. According to the problem-solving model,
the end of mediation is to solve the problem and to settle the dispute through
an agreement.o In contrast, the objective of the transformative model is not
to settle the dispute, but to engender a transformation between the parties
that is of two dimensions: empowerment and recognition. A mediation has
fulfilled its transformative objective when these two dimensions are
76. Rose v. State, 601 So. 2d 1181, 1183 (Fla. 1992); Leslie W. Abramson, The Judicial
Ethics ofEx Parte and Other Communications, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 1343, 1355-56 (2000).
77. Rifkin et al., supra note 5, at 153, 157-58.
78. MOORE, supra note 14, at 52.
79. Id.
80. ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING WITHOUT GIVING IN
(1983); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 16, at 758; MOORE, supra note 14, at 52.
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manifested in the process even if the process does not end in an agreement.
The perception of the mediator's neutrality plays a vital role in both models.
2. Neutrality According to the Problem-Solving Model
The accepted meaning of neutrality according to the problem-solving
model is defined by Moore, who is of the opinion that the mediator's
neutrality has two dimensions: neutrality and impartiality.82 Neutrality is
related to mediator-parties relations, and it generally means the absence of
any previous connection between them. If there is or was such a
connection, the mediator must not show any preference toward that party.'
Impartiality is related to the position that the mediator takes in regard to the
dispute.85 The mediator must be free from personal or professional interests
in any of the parties, in their interests, or in a certain outcome.86
Moore clarifies that neutrality and impartiality do not mean the absence
of a personal opinion regarding the desired result, which is not possible in
any event.87 The obligation incumbent on the mediator, in Moore's opinion,
is not to evade a personal opinion, but to suspend it in order to be able to
88fulfill a commitment to help the parties to reach a decision of their own.
The ultimate test of the existence of neutrality, in his opinion, is the
subjective judgment of the parties.89
As to the scope of neutrality, Moore makes a distinction between
process and content.90 In his opinion, the role of the mediator is to conduct a
81. ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION:
RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION (1994) [hereinafter BUSH
& FOLGER, RESPONDING TO CONFLICT]; ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE
PROMISE OF MEDIATION: THE TRANSFORMATIVE APPROACH TO CONFLICT 73-74 (rev. ed. 2005)
[hereinafter BUSH & FOLGER TRANSFORMATIVE APPROACH].
82. MOORE, supra note 14, at 50-51.
83. Id. at 52.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Standard 11 (2005), available
at http://www.abanet.org/dispute/documents/modelstandardsconductapril2007.pdf; UNIF.
MEDIATION ACT §9 (amended 2003), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/mediat/2003finaldraft.htm.
87. MOORE, supra note 14, at 50-51.
88. See id. at 53.
89. Id. at 54.
90. Id.
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fair process, not to advance any specific outcome.9' Therefore, the mediator
must demonstrate complete neutrality and avoid expressing a stand on the
result of the dispute.92 Nonetheless, neutrality of this scope is not possible in
relation to conducting the process. 93 Therefore, whereas in relation to the
outcome the mediator must take care to remain neutral to leave control in the
hands of the parties, in the matter of the process neutrality is to be
manifested in maintaining fair procedural standards. 94  Maintaining
procedural fairness, though, may oblige the mediator to stray from his
formalistic neutral position and to take an active, involved stance.95
Rifkin, Millen, and Cobb define the practice of neutrality in a somewhat
different fashion. In their view, neutrality has two aspects: impartiality and
equidistance. Impartiality means the absence of a personal interest in the
parties or in the outcome of the dispute.98 The mediator must suspend
personal judgments and outlooks, as well as private emotions and agendas.99
Impartiality is manifested in taking a passive, formalistic position, in
maintaining distance, and in the lack of any emotional involvement.'"
Equal distance is maintained by helping each party to express its side of
the dispute to be able to identify their respective interests. This requirement
is based on the assumption of the importance of exposing all hidden interests
generating the dispute so as to be able to reach a just agreement.'0 '
Fulfilling this objective necessitates that the mediator adopt an active stand;
namely, to create symmetry between the parties.102 This is done by the
mediators temporarily linking up with each party and entering into a
temporary condition of partiality to encourage each party to tell their
story. 03 Equal distance is maintained between each of the parties at the
conclusion of the process.'" In general, this stage occurs in the course of
the caucuses.'05
91. Id
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 53.
96. Rifkin et al., supra note 5, at 152.
97. Id. at 152.
98. Id
99. Id. at 151-53.
100. Id
101. Cobb & Rifkin, supra note 7, at 46-47.
102. Id
103. Id
104. Id. at 43-46.
105. Id at 46-47.
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Rifkin, Millen, and Cobb think that the idea of preserving equal distance
contradicts the notion of impartiality: whereas impartiality is connected with
demonstrating a similar attitude toward both sides without relating to their
personality and their preferences, maintaining equal distance-as it occurs at
the caucus stage-is connected with creating a personal relationship between
the mediator and the parties.106  Whereas impartiality is connected with
adopting the viewpoint of a neutral observer who is not sensitive to the
differences between the parties, a personal relationship obligates the
mediator to focus on a concrete other, one having a unique face and special
needs, and to form relationships of trust and closeness with that other.'
For these reasons, Rifkin, Millen, and Cobb argue that a paradoxical
relationship exists between the two aforementioned aspects of neutrality.'0o
It is impossible to adopt a stance of distance, characterized by passivity,
objectivity, and the absence of an emotional connection, which are also
characteristics of impartiality, while forming trustful relationships with the
parties and showing empathy and support for them.'09 In those researchers'
opinion, the caucuses might undermine the triad structure and create feelings
that the mediator is forming a coalition with one party."o When this
becomes clear to the mediator, internal pressure arises to resume the
formalistic position of impartiality."' The transition from one position to
the other, Rifkin, Millen, and Cobb argue, sends the parties a mixed message
and makes things difficult for the mediator."12
Cobb and Rifkin claim that the aforementioned paradoxical structure is
a product of the tension between two basic assumptions of the neutrality
concept." 3  The first assumption is that the necessity for neutrality in
relation to content is broader than in relation to process.114 This assumption
stems from the perception that exclusive control of the outcome is in the
hands of the parties and the role of the mediator is procedural in essence."'
106. Rifken et al., supra note 5, at 152.
107. Cobb & Rifkin, supra note 7, at 46-47. For the tension between impartiality and personal
relations, see BENZIMAN, supra note 54, at 87.
108. Rifkin et al., supra note 5, at 152.
109. Lisa Parola Gaynier, In Search of a Theory of Practice: What Does Gestalt Have to Offer
to the Field ofMediation?, 7 GESTALT REV. 180, 192 (2003).
110. Rifkin et al., supra note 5, at 153-55.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Cobb & Rifkin, supra note 7, at 46-47.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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Because the parties are responsible for the agreement, the basis of the
mediator's responsibility for substantive justice drops away."'6
The second assumption is that the mediator's role is to assist the parties
in exposing their interests so they can come to an agreement embodying
procedural justice."' On the basis of this assumption, the mediator manages
not only process but also content. If in the mediator's opinion the agreement
is not fair, he must not stand aside: he must become involved and act toward
advancing a just agreement. A mediator who fulfills this role takes
responsibility for substantive justice. 18
From the foregoing, it seems that the paradox between the two aspects
of neutrality is a product of the desire to confine the role of the mediator to
process only and to minimize the mediator's impact on outcome, a desire
that does not accord with the inherent affinity between process and content.
Bush and Folger argue that the problem-solving model creates a hidden
interest to solve the dispute in the mediator, which causes the mediator to
use procedural practices that necessarily influence the outcome." 9 These
practices are manifested in the overt or covert pressure exerted on the parties
to come to an agreement instead of leaving decision-making in their
hands.120 In consequence, the agreement does not respond to the needs of
the parties as they see them, but to their needs as perceived by the
mediator.12' Based on Silbey and Merry's study,122 Bush and Folger
identify three types of procedural practices that influence the outcome:12 3
1. Diagnosing the dispute. Diagnosis of the characteristics of a dispute
is accomplished through mapping the subjects in dispute, evaluating the
extent to which a common denominator exists between the parties, and
assessing the chances for reaching an agreement.
2. Activating procedural strategies that impact the terms of the
agreement. The clearest procedural strategy is to focus on one solution that,
in the mediator's view, is the most desirable, without examining other
options. 12 Generally the parties are unaware of this practice, and therefore
they express no objection to it.
116. Id
117. Id
118. Id.
119. BUSH & FOLGER, RESPONDING TO CONFLICT,supra note 81, at 74-76, 104.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Susan Silbey & Sally E. Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 LAW & POL'Y 7 (1986).
123. BUSH & FOLGER, RESPONDING TO CONFLICT, supra note 81, at 64-70.
124. CONLEY & O'BARR, supra note 11, at 54-55.
484
18
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 11, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 11
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol11/iss3/11
[Vol. 11: 467, 2011]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
3. Removing problematic topics from the agenda. Topics stricken from
the agenda will generally be those that lessen the chance of reaching an
agreement. At times, these will be sensitive topics for which it is difficult to
find a defined, concrete solution.
In Bush and Folger's argument, these procedural practices allow a
mediator to intentionally exert her power covertly to limit the parties'
control of the result. 12 5 The agreement reached in the mediation, in which
these practices were used, will exclude, in their opinion, some of the parties'
interests in favor of the mediator's interest in solving the problem.' 6 This
presents a paradox: on the one hand, the objective of the problem-solving
model is to bring about an agreement that will satisfy the needs of the
parties; on the other hand, when the mediator acts as problem-solver, she
necessarily uses practices that direct the parties to a desired agreement while
dimming their needs. 127 These procedural practices illuminate the problem
connected with grounding the notion of neutrality on a distinction between
process and content.
The principal reason for this problem is the hybrid nature of mediation,
which combines principles of democratic participation and principles of
adversarial-competitive participation.128  Democratic participation is
embodied through the sovereignty of the parties over both the process and
the outcome. 129 Competitive participation, in contrast, emanates from the
dispute between the parties and, in general, necessitates the involvement of a
third party, which detracts from their sovereignty.130 On one hand the
mediator aims for neutrality to further the democratic process, thus fulfilling
the principle of self-determination.' 3 ' On the other hand, a mediator's
neutrality attempts to come as close as possible to the model of judicial
impartiality, which embodies the covert effect of a third party on the
result.132
125. BUSH & FOLGER, RESPONDING TO CONFLICT, supra note 81, at 72-73.
126. Id. at 105-06.
127. Id. at 75.
128. Id. at 72-73, 105-06.
129. Id
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 72-73.
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The distinction between process and outcome has been criticized even in
the context of judicial impartiality.'13 In mediation, this distinction is all the
more problematic because process and content have a mutual affinity and, in
effect, are inseparably interconnected: the agreements reached by the parties
are formulated continuously during the process, not only at its conclusion.
Similarly, whereas active judicial involvement in the adversarial process at
the argument-presenting stage might create a real concern of partiality, the
mediator's involvement in the conduct of the mediation process is thought to
be an inherent part of the mediator's role. 134  An active mediator who
presents open-ended questions to the parties and whose ear is attuned to their
needs and interests is encouraging participation, not harming it. 3 1
The tension between the direct affinity of process and content in
mediation and the attempt to ground the concept of the mediator's neutrality
on a distinction between process and content is especially problematic in
situations where a power gap exists between the parties. These situations
pose a special challenge to the mediator. Leaving full sovereignty over the
outcome in the hands of the parties might harm the fairness of the process
and end in an agreement that neglects the weaker party. Alternatively,
involvement in power relations-for example, by adopting practices to
empower the weaker party-might be perceived by the stronger party as
impinging on the equal distance between the mediator and each of the
parties.
The literature dealing with the problem-solving model does not analyze
this dilemma sufficiently and generally attributes decisive significance to the
principle of self-determination without relating to the affinity between
certain parties and the political and social structure.'37 Moore, for instance,
contends that self-determination is the most important principle in the
mediation process, and therefore as a rule the mediator must refrain from
becoming involved in power relationships.138 An exception to this rule, in
his opinion, is open violence by one side or situations in which the parties
are about to reach an agreement that is unfair, non-implementable, or non-
sustainable.'
133. See Bush, supra note 33, at 258.
134. See id. at 282.
135. See id
136. MOORE, supra note 14, at 68-69; Susan N. Exon, How Can a Mediator Be Both Impartial
and Fair: Why Ethical Standards of Conduct Create Chaos for Mediators? 5, 7, 20-27, 46 (The
Berkeley Electronic Press, Working Paper No. 1540, 2006), available at
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=7078&context-=expresso.
137. MOORE, supra note 14, at 74-76.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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Taylor proposes to exchange the concept of formal neutrality for a
model of expanded neutrality.'" Expanded neutrality would entitle a
mediator to employ techniques of influencing and directing a party to the
content-power balancing included-when in the mediator's opinion it is
vital to reach an agreement that will respond to the needs of the parties. In
Taylor's opinion, a too-firm commitment to the principle of neutrality might
constitute an obstacle and lead to an agreement that will not respond to the
parties' true needs.14' Nevertheless, she is of the opinion that the mediator
has to refrain from exerting overt pressure on the parties to adopt a certain
position or to accept an agreement that they do not really want.142 Such a
practice will not be neutral even under the expanded approach. 4 3
These outlooks are based on a limited perception of power, one that
takes into consideration only overt power. They do not deal with the manner
in which power gaps originating in the social, political, and cultural structure
affect the autonomy of the parties.
3. Neutrality according to the Transformative Model
Bush and Folger recognize the problem of distinguishing between
process and content and are aware of the influence of the mediator on
process and content alike.'" Nonetheless, they claim that this influence
stems from the ideology of the problem-solving model and may be
overcome by means of an alternative neutrality concept that recognizes the
influence of the mediator both on the process of mediation and on its
outcome.145 According to this concept, the power of the mediator may be
harnessed for the very purpose of intensifying the parties' autonomy.14 6 In
other words, it is true that the mediator will use power, but not for the
purpose of directing the parties to a certain result. This concept of neutrality
manifests the mediator's commitment to use power to ensure the parties'
exclusive control of the outcome.
140. Alison Taylor, Concepts of Neutrality in Family Mediation: Contexts, Ethics, Influence
and Transformative Process, 14 MEDIATION Q. 215, 224-225 (1997).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. BUSH & FOLGER, RESPONDING TO CONFLICT, supra note 81, at 105.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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This meaning of neutrality, according to Bush and Folger, increases the
chances that the agreement-if reached-will reflect the interests of the
parties, and not those of the mediator.147 Therefore, neutrality in this sense
advances the ends of the transformative model: empowerment and
recognition.14 8  Empowerment, according to this model, is based on the
assumption that the expertise of the parties in regard to their own problems
and needs is greater than that of the mediator.14 9 This perception obligates
the mediator to assume a passive stance and to greatly minimize the extent
of his involvement in the decision-making process: the mediator's role
should amount to a reflection of what the parties said, summative statements,
clarification of differences of opinion, illuminating mutual understandings,
and so forth.150 According to this approach, instead of leading the parties to
what in the mediator's e es is the desired solution, the mediator should
follow in their footsteps.' I It follows that the mediator must refrain from
exertin pressure on the parties' 5 2 or from giving them professional or other
advice. Similarly, the mediator must avoid employing power-balancing
practices because doing so may lead to making premature assumptions about
power relationships that are not necessarily based on what the parties feel. 54
Intervening in power relationships under these circumstances might weaken
the parties, not empower them.'55  Therefore, such involvement must be
limited only to circumstances in which clear signs exist that one of the
parties is troubled by the lack of equilibrium. 56 Moreover, even when the
parties reach an agreement the mediator believes unfair, the mediator must
147. Id. at 105-06.
148. BUSH & FOLGER, TRANSFORMATIVE APPROACH, supra note 81, at 249-51.
149. Id.
150. Ran Kuttner, Striving to Fulfill the Promise: The Purple House Conversations and the
Practice of Transformative Mediation, 22 NEGOTIATION J. 331, 339-40 (2006).
151. BUSH & FOLGER, TRANSFORMATIVE APPROACH, supra note 81, at 248.
152. Bush, supra note 33, at 282-83.
153. BUSH & FOLGER, RESPONDING TO CONFLICT, supra note 8 1, at 95-96.
154. Robert A. Baruch Bush & Joseph P. Folger, Transformative Mediation and Third Party
Intervention: Ten Hallmarks of a Transformative Approach to Practice, 13 MEDIATION Q. 263, 268-
69 (1996). In the second edition of their book, Bush and Folger refrain from discussing the concept
of the mediator's neutrality. This might point to the fact that they retracted their original concept of
neutrality, but could offer no alternative notion. Nevertheless, from the mediation processes
exemplified in the book, especially that of "The Purple House," which was directed by Bush himself,
it seems that radical neutrality practice, manifested in the mediator's passive stance, continues to
fulfill a respected role in the transformative model. See BUSH & FOLGER, TRANSFORMATIVE
APPROACH, supra note 81, at 131.
155. Bush & Folger, supra note 154, at 268-69.
156. Id.
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refrain from udging it so long as it reflects, in his opinion, the free will of
the parties."
This concept of neutrality overcomes, on its face, the paradox that arises
in the problem-solving model, a paradox that derives from basing the notion
of neutrality on a distinction between process and content. This distinction
makes it difficult for the mediator to determine when to become involved in
content and the proper scope of such involvement. The transformative
model attempts to deal with this dilemma by adopting a quite inflexible
concept of impartiality.'"8 In other words, whereas the concept of neutrality
that is customary in the problem-solving model is a dual notion combining
impartiality and trust relations, neutrality according to the transformative
model concedes the dimension of trust relations; it is left only with a concept
of impartiality similar in essence to that practiced in the pure adversarial
model, a concept that generally limits the practice of holding caucuses." 9 In
contrast to the adversarial process, however, in which the passive judicial
stance is taken only in relation to process-because the outcome is
determined by the judge's decision-the mediator in the process conducted
according to the transformative model may assume a passive position toward
both the process and the content, given the assumption that this increases the
parties' chances of becoming empowered.'60
The concept according to which a "clean" stand of impartiality
intensifies empowerment has been criticized.' 6 ' This notion, it is argued,
creates a narrow perception of empowerment based on an assumption of the
radical autonomy of parties that does not recognize the effect of structural
limitations on the ability to participate in mediation effectively.162
According to this criticism, the acquisition of personal skills, such as the
ability to conduct negotiations, is insufficient in itself to enable parties from
disadvantaged groups to participate in mediation as agents, so long as there
is no accompanying development of a critical consciousness toward the
hegemonic social order.163 In the absence of such a consciousness, these
157. Id. at 268.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 268-69.
160. See id
161. See generally Peter Adler, The Ideologies of Mediation: The Movement's Own Story, 10
LAW & POL'Y 319, 333 (1988).
162. See generally id
163. Erica L. Fox, Alone in the Hallway: Challenges to Effective Self-Representation in
Negotiation, I HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 85, 102-03 (1996).
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parties cannot recognize the legitimacy of their position and employ the
skills they have acquired.'6" The structural limitations might necessitate that
the mediator provide these parties with active assistance to be able to act as
autonomous agents: 65 a mediator who chooses to hide behind a veil of
ignorance and demonstrate intentional blindness toward power gaps that
originate in structural limitations frustrates the fulfillment of the objectives
of the transformative model.'" These goals do not accord with impartiality.
Furthermore, the adoption of an inflexible concept of impartiality also
embodies a paradox. Despite the fact that the transformative model seeks to
advance empowerment and recognition as its objectives and to pave the way
for a society of relationships, its perception of neutrality actually undermines
this objective because it does not advance relationships between the
mediator and the parties.167 As Kuttner argues, the model is interested in
advancing relations among the 6arties themselves; however, the mediator is
missing from those relations.' The neutral perception of impartiality is
based on an erroneous assumption that so long as the mediator reveals a
greater degree of passivity and remains distant from communication between
the parties, their autonomy will strengthen and their chances of undergoing
empowerment increases.'69  However, a stand of non-involvement, as
Kuttner notes, does not necessarily advance empowerment.170 Gaynier, too,
argues that to create the kind of contact between the parties that will enable
them to see each other's viewpoint and to develop new possibilities, a
passive stand and refraining from judgment are insufficient; what is required
is the active intervention of the mediator."' In her opinion, Bush and
Folger's concern that mediation activism will cause the mediator to not act
impartially does not hold.172  The best way of coping with the fear of
partiality is, in her opinion, to be aware of its existence and to recognize the
limitations stemming from it.'73
164. Id.
165. Gaynier, supra note 109, at 192, 194.
166. Id.
167. See id. at 192.
168. Kuttner, supra note 150, at 340-42.
169. See Gaynier, supra note 109, at 191.
170. Kuttner, supra note 150, at 340-42.
171. See Lisa P. Gaynier, Transformative Mediation: In Search of a Theory of Practice, 22
CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 397 (2005).
172. Id at 406.
173. Id. See also Daniel Bowling & David A. Hoffman, Bringing Peace into the Room, in
BRINGING PEACE INTO THE ROOM: How THE PERSONAL QUALITIES OF THE MEDIATOR IMPACT THE
PROCESS OF CONFLICT REsOLUTION 13, 21-22, 39-40 (Daniel Bowling & David A. Hoffman eds.,
2003).
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The approach in which a stringent perception of impartiality is adopted
to intensify empowerment creates yet another paradox: this approach is
based on the assumption that it is possible to increase the democratic-
empowering characteristics of mediation through adopting an ethical stand
originally intended for a competitive-adversarial process that does not
entrust the parties with decision-making power. Like the judge, the
transformative mediator stands behind a veil of ignorance, taking a passive
stance, remaining at a distance from the parties, and refraining from any
intimate situation or establishing relationships of trust-except that this
time, such a stand is meant to encourage democratic participation that
realizes the principles of empowerment and recognition instead of an
objective decision by a third party.
This concept of neutrality creates a new kind of hegemonic narrative: a
narrative of pure neutrality that turns mediation into a democratic forum
clear of power that enables the parties to experience empowerment. This is
a radical individuation narrative free of the influences of the social and
political structure.'74
The hegemonic narrative camouflages the effects of covert power
practices that are put into effect even in a mediation conducted by a mediator
who is not fully motivated to reach an agreement. As Gaynier states, at
times, the very presence of the mediator in the room is enough to impact the
content even if the mediator makes no sound.'17 The hegemonic narrative of
absolute neutrality as an empowerment mechanism also denies covert power
developed by the parties among themselves that is not necessarily
manifested in open coercion or violence. Thus, a party who is fluent in the
language of the experts might employ power over non-fluent parties. In
those circumstances, the mediator's passive stand of non-involvement will
give validity to the covert preference that exists in the discourse to the
language of experts, thereby allowing alternative narratives, such as
narratives of relationships, to be excluded from the mediation.
4. Neutrality as a Regulatory Mechanism
In the introduction to this part, I briefly mentioned that the neutrality of
the mediator is a hybrid combining two dimensions: impartiality and trust.
174. EDWARD W. SCHWERIN, MEDIATION, CITIZEN EMPOWERMENT, AND TRANSFORMATIONAL
POLITICS 66-70 (1995).
175. Gaynier, supra note 109, at 192.
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Rifkin, Millen, and Cobb argue that continuous tension exists between these
two dimensions.'7 1 I now want to look closely at this tension.
The duty of impartiality is considered a necessary condition, one that is
self-evident, for the fairness of the whole process of dispute resolution in
which a third party is involved. Generally, this requirement is identified
with the role of the judge in the adversarial procedure and is considered vital
to gaining trust in the specific judge as well as gaining the public's trust in
adjudication. For the judge to maintain impartiality, the adversarial process
sets down formal rules, the objective of which is to prevent intimacy and
over-proximity between judge and litigant. The judge sits at a physical
distance from the litigants, generally on a raised platform, addresses the
lawyers and not the litigants directly, and is forbidden to hold private
meetings with them. 77
Whereas the duty of impartiality is meant to create distance and formal
relations, the requirement of gaining trust is intended to achieve the opposite
goal: forming trustful relations. To fulfill this goal, the mediator creates
intimacy with the parties by sitting close to them, addressing them directly in
everyday language, and meeting privately with them. Such meetings are of
central importance in mediation. In the course of the meeting, the mediator
assists the parties in identifying their needs and interests, earns their trust,
and receives information that can aid in solving the dispute. These
objectives cannot be realized in a joint meeting, which is usually
characterized by an atmosphere of tension, suspicion, and even hostility.
Gaining the parties' trust applies not only to the mediator but also to
other professionals, such as lawyers and psychologists. Nevertheless, it has
two special characteristics in mediation: first, it applies to disputing parties
who are situated on both sides of the barricade; second, it integrates the
requirement of impartiality. In this regard, I have commented elsewhere as
follows:
The duty of neutrality is unique to the mediator and does not apply to other professionals.
The lawyer, psychologist, social worker, or physician bears a duty of trust toward a
person or persons situated on the same side of the barricade. In contrast, the obligation of
gaining trust on the part of the mediator covers parties who are situated on both sides of
the barricade; and in multi-party disputes, envelops many parties, whose interests might
differ and even be contradictory. Whereas the lawyer is strictly forbidden to represent
opposing parties on the same issue, the function of the mediator is by its very nature to
assist the parties to the dispute in conducting negotiations among themselves.
176. Rifkin et al., supra note 5, at 152.
177. Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359, 1383-89.
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And therefore, there is no other professional occupation, except for mediation, in which
the professional bears the duty of neutrality: this applies, as a rule, only to one who holds
judicial office. Thus, on the one hand, special relations of trust are formed between the
parties and the mediator that are not created with a judge; such relations are more similar
in essence to those created with professionals. On the other hand, the duty of neutrality
that is incumbent on the mediator is reminiscent, at least in t impartiality aspect, of
judicial neutrality, which does not apply to other professionals.
The combination of impartiality and trust creates special tension for the
mediator. This tension does not exist in the adversarial process where the
judge bears a duty of impartiality alone. It also does not appear in lawyer-
client relations, for instance, in which the duty of trust applies just toward
the client, and does not cover the client's rival.
In my opinion, a close examination of this tension reveals that it does
not reflect two aspects of neutrality but two different ethical concepts:' 79 an
ethic of impartiality and an ethic of care. The former reflects objective
justice and fairness, manifested in a passive stance, distance, and standing
behind a veil of ignorance; in other words, it allows for the observation of
the dispute and the parties to it from a bird's eye view or from nowhere.
This ethic is what creates the problematic distinction between process and
content, which does not allow the mediator to intervene in the content of the
dispute. In contrast, the ethic of care means responsibility toward the other
party and concern for that person's needs; it is manifested in forming a
personal relationship with each side and showing empathy, involvement,
understanding, and support. This latter ethic might necessitate that the
mediator intervene in the content of the dispute. An ethic of impartiality is
characterized by blindness toward differences between parties, whereas an
ethic of care manifests itself in seeing the parties' unique faces and showing
sensitivity toward their distress and the circumstances of their lives.
The two ethical concepts maintain a "structural coupling"
relationship,s 0  marked by dialectic characteristics: each concept
simultaneously imparts legitimacy and challenges the other. The ethic of
impartiality bestows on the mediator the halo and prestige of the judge and
awards her the status of an expert in dispute resolution, while the ethic of
care enables the mediator to stand in opposition to the judge by not having
178. Ronit Zamir, The Confidentiality Between the Mediator and the Parties to Mediation, in
JUDGE URI KITrAI BOOK 45, 61-62 (Boaz Sangero ed., 2007) [Heb].
179. For the two concepts of morality, see BENZIMAN, supra note 54, at 87.
180. For the notion of "structural coupling," see Alan Hunt, Foucault's Expulsion of Law:
Toward a Retrieval, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 11, 33-38 (1992).
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power and by being placed in the arena of care, concern, and
communication, in which individuals are free to reach solutions that respond
to their needs.
The affinity that is created between mediation and law through the ethic
of impartiality is meant to give mediation a basis of professionalism and to
enable those who practice it to achieve closure and distinction through their
expertise in dispute settlement, similar to that of a judge.'8 ' Additionally,
this affinity is intended to increase the attractiveness of mediation in the eyes
of potential parties and to market it to institutional bodies, such as the courts,
as an effective and fair process. The practices that create this affinity
include: an emphasis on the mediator's expertise in the area of disputes,'
affinity to the courts, and giving an appreciation of the court's expected
outcome. This affinity is especially prominent in mediation programs
operated in the shadow of the court. In this sense, the affinity between
mediation and the court acts to stress the similarity between the function of
the mediator and that of the judge.183 As Douglas and Field stated:
The problem-solving nature of court-ordered mediation is comparable to the court-
ordered nature of litigation; and the notions of mediator neutrality arguably make
problem-solving models of mediation credible, because there is an overt connection with
the language and ideology of judicial impartiality. This is an aspect of court-ordered
mediation that possibly draws potential parties to the mediation process; that is, because
of neutrality's promise of fairness and its offer of protection against biased or unfair
practice. Such protections connect problem-soling mediation with the authority and
legitimacy offormal legal adjudication processes.
Whereas the ethic of impartiality portrays mediation as having a direct
affinity to law, the ethic of care not only denies a connection between
mediation and law, it seeks to establish mediation as an antithesis to it, as a
democratic and empowering process, in which individuals can employ
autonomy and conscious choice and freely reach an outcome that fits their
needs.' The mediator assists the parties in fulfilling these goals through
strengthening their autonomy and improving relations between them.'86 The
mediator must listen to their personal narrative and demonstrate empathy
and concern toward them.88 The attentive mediator, sensitive to the distress
181. See RONEN SHAMIR, THE COLONIES OF LAW: COLONIALISM, ZIONISM AND LAW IN EARLY
MANDATE PALESTINE 116 (2000).
182. Deborah M. Kolb, To Be a Mediator: Expressive Tactics in Mediation, 41 J. Soc. ISSUES
11, 15 (1985).
183. Douglas & Field, supra note 8, at 72.
184. Id. (emphasis added).
185. Id. at 82.
186. Id
187. Id.
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of the parties, is portrayed as one who is powerless, as an antithesis to a
judge. The mediator sits around the same table as the parties and speaks
their every day language. The mediator does not aspire to lead the parties to
an objective outcome that stems from exogenous legal rules, but assists them
in expressing their subjective needs and in reaching an agreement that will
respond to those same needs.'88 In other words, the caring mediator is not
situated behind a veil of ignorance, but is sensitive to differences between
parties, their unique faces, and their personal voices.
The duality of the affinity to law and opposition to law establishes
mediation as a regulatory forum in which both a juridical-negative power
and a disciplinary-positive power operate simultaneously.189  Mediation is
established in opposition to law as a democratic arena in which responsible
individuals, who are free and autonomous, participate by themselves and are
capable of making decisions that best serve their interests. 90 Alternatively,
mediation is established "in the shadow of the law" 91 to grant it legitimacy
and to portray all those who practice mediation as having the quality of
neutrality.
This duality operates to mask the power that is at work in mediation. It
is manifested in the operation of routine mediation practices that are
perceived as a natural part of the mediation process; indeed, the parties-and
at times the mediators themselves-are often unaware of their latent
power. 19 2 Thus, this duality creates a "thin" perception of procedural justice
that evades informal barriers to participation originating in political poverty
and an unequal social structure." The thin conception of procedural justice
harms disadvantaged groups' effective participation in mediation and creates
a built-in preference for hegemonic narratives; that is, narratives that
camouflage the connection between the storyteller and the social structure
and preserve existing power relations, which are perceived as natural, self-
evident, and therefore, unassailable.19 4
188. Id. at 81-82.
189. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOL. 1: AN INTRODUCTION 51-52
(1978).
190. See Peter Fitzpatrick, The Rise and Rise ofInformalism, in INFORMAL JUSTICE? 178, 190-
92 (Roger Matthews ed., 1988).
191. For the phrase "in the shadow of the law" see Robert Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser,
Bargaining in the Shadow ofthe Law: The Case ofDivorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
192. See Douglas & Field, supra note 8, at 82.
193. Id. at 83.
194. See Patricia Ewick & Susan Silbey, Subversive Stories and Hegemonic Tales: Toward a
Sociology ofNarrative, 29 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 197, 214-15, 221 (1995).
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One of the principal examples of the operation of a thin perception of
procedural justice in mediation is prioritizing narratives of rules over
narratives of relationship. As mentioned earlier, the ideoloy of mediation
attributes great importance to relations between parties,' 9 in contrast to
litigation, which gives clear preference to the language of rules and to the
form of rational argument.19 Still, Cobb and Rifkin's studies show that
narratives of relationship receive an inferior status even in mediation, not
only in litigation.' The reason they give for this surprising finding is that
narratives of relationship have an open and unstable internal structure,
characterized by a circular story line and faulty temporal continuity.'98 This
structure causes narratives of relationship to be perceived as unconvincing
and lacking relevance for reaching an agreement. Their lack of stability
exposes them to continual undermining and transformation,199 for instance
by their translation into the language of rules. In contrast, narratives of rules
are characterized by a coherent, linear, and closed internal structure; being
grounded on rational arguments, they create an affinity to the dominant
culture and express some hegemonic truth.2 00 These characteristics cause
narratives of rules to be perceived as possessing internal convincing power,
making them relatively stable and lessening the chances of their taking on a
renewed interpretation.201
Cobb and Rifkin criticize this phenomenon, arguing that it causes
educated and fluent participants to receive preference in mediation, while
participants from disadvantaged groups do not participate effectively. 202 For
example, Kandel's socio-linguistic study of mediation in divorce
proceedings shows the following:
Some parents are much better at meeting the rhetorical burdens of mediation than others.
In reading and re-reading the texts of the mediation narratives it becomes obvious to me
195. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 16, at 760; BUSH & FOLGER, RESPONDING TO CONFLICT,
supra note 81, at 81; BUSH & FOLGER, TRANSFORMATIVE APPROACH, supra note 81, at 77, 252-53.
196. CONLEY & O'BARR, supra note 11, at 67-68.
197. Cobb & Rifkin, supra note 7, at 51-57.
198. Id.
199. Scott Beattie, Is Mediation a Real Alternative to Law? Pitfalls for Aboriginal Participants,
8 AUSTRL. DISP. RESOL. J. 57, 66-67 (1997).
200. Sara Cobb, Empowerment and Mediation: A Narrative Perspective, 9 NEGOTIATION J.
245, 252-53 (1993); Cobb & Rifkin, supra note 7, at 52-57; Dale Bagshaw, Language, Power and
Mediation, 14 AUSTRALASIAN DISP. RESOL. J. 130 (2003).
201. Cobb & Rifkin, supra note 7, at 51-54; Cobb, supra note 200, at 252.
202. Cobb & Rifkin, supra note 7, at 25.
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that those parents who seemed to "tell a better story" garnered the mediator's support203behind them and prevailed more often in terms of agreement.
Cobb and Rifkin found that participation in mediation not only fails to
advance narratives of relationship, but it furthers an adversarial pattern of
relations: most mediation processes examined were characterized by a
pattern similar to that of adversarial litigation, of guilt and counter-guilt,
reaction and counter-reaction. 204 The narrative that was told first generally
became the dominant narrative. Because the first narrative positions the
other party as being responsible for the conflict and forces the other to
respond to the charge and to deny responsibility, this narrative creates an
adversarial pattern of relations in which one party's story is without content
of its own and exists only in relation to the first narrative.205 In some cases,
it became clear that the other party does not succeed at all in telling her
story; she was preoccupied only in denying the first narrative. In Cobb and
Rifkin's opinion, the adversarial pattern, which grants preference to the first
narrative, limits the possibility of transformation of the two narratives,
because the potential alternative narrative remains illegitimate and untold.206
Therefore, the natural preference given in mediation to narratives of
rules limits effective participation of parties who are unable to tell their story
coherently and logically, whether because the language of rules is not
accessible to them or because their interests cannot be given expression in a
mediation framework.207 The covert preference given to the language of
rules causes difficulties for participants from disadvantaged groups that
superficially receive an equal chance to participate in the process to find,
within the dominant language, the voice and words to express their own
interests.208 Furthermore, participation that is restricted to the language of
rules will make it difficult to generate a transformation in the dominant
narrative because narratives of relationship often represent viewpoints from
the periphery. They have the power, when given the chance, to challenge
the hegemonic narrative and to pave the way to including new points of view
203. Randy Frances Kandel, Power Plays: A Sociolinguistic Study of Inequality in Child
Custody Mediation and a Hearsay Analog Solution, 36 ARIZ. L. REv. 879, 896 (1994).
204. Cobb & Rifkin, supra note 7, at 25.
205. Id at 58.
206. Id. at 53.
207. See IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 37-39 (2000) (discussing
audience preference for logical formulaic articulations in discussions about democratic politics).
208. Id. at 119.
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in the mediatory discourse. 209 The exclusion of these narratives limits the
chances of advancing a transformative participatory process that would
expand the ruling viewpoint and open it up to new possibilities. In other
words, their exclusion leads to preference being given to hegemonic
narratives and the silencing of subversive narratives undermining the
hegemonic logic. 210
Women constitute one of the main groups that may be harmed by the
thin notion of procedural justice. As Grillo argues, the ideology of
mediation, which attributes importance to communication and to relations
and therefore intrinsically conceals assurances to improve the effective
participation of women in comparison to litigation, dissipates in effect
within unwritten micro-legal norms that exclude the feminine voice and
weaken the situation of women in comparison to a court proceeding.2 11
What distinguishes the micro-social environment of mediation from today's
usual "shoulds," in her opinion, is the existence of a sanction. 21 2 Many
sanctions might be viewed as trivial at first glance: a smile that casually
dismisses the words of one of the parties, criticism of someone who does not
place a child's needs as a top priority, a guideline not to discuss a certain
topic, evading what one of the parties has to say, and so forth.213
These micro-legal practices embody a normalizing, disciplinary power,
whose objective is to coerce the parties onto the correct path of
participation.2 14 These practices create inequality between the parties, and
they are capable of covertly introducing into mediation quasi-adversarial
characteristics. By setting standards for a "normal narrative," they act to
discipline and normalize the narrative, determine what language is permitted
to be spoken, and what is considered a legitimate narrative.2 ' The result is
giving preference to the hegemonic narrative, a narrative of rules based on
universal claims of truth.
The perception of thin procedural justice is to a large extent a product of
adopting a myth of neutrality, which in general remains hidden: the location
209. Cobb, supra note 200, at 252.
210. YOUNG, supra note 207, at 41-43 (discussing privileged group's exclusion of
disharmonious interests in political dialogue).
211. Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J.
1545, 1555-57, 1605-07 (1991).
212. Id
213. Id at 1556.
214. FOUCAULT, supra note 189, at 51-52; Peter Fitzpatrick, The Impossibility of Informal
Justice, in THE POSSIBILITY OF POPULAR JUSTICE: A CASE STUDY OF COMMUNITY MEDIATION IN
THE UNITED STATES 458 (Sally Engle Merry & Neal Milner eds., 1993) (suggesting that mediators
maneuver individuals into "certain defining modes of engagement").
215. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 214, at 458.
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of neutrality between law and discipline enables it to act as a barrier
blocking the oppositions between them. This double aspect allows it to
periodically reveal another face in accordance with the circumstances. If the
mediator is suspected of employing power, he can present a face of caring;
additionally, if the mediator is suspected of lacking professionalism, he can
present a face of expertise and impartiality. Thin procedural justice allows
the mediator to show the harsh, coercive face of law or the humane face of
concern and care as he deems fit.
The mythical nature of neutrality in general has not been addressed in
the mediation literature, but a few researchers deal with it. For example,
Cobb and Rifkin argue that neutrality is a folklore term that is
simultaneously transparent and opaque: transparent because it is based on
self-evident assumptions that are difficult to decompose, and opaque
because it is difficult to uncork the nature of the practice of neutrality from
the self-evident assumtions that neutrality performs more as a character
trait than as a practice. 16 Kolb and Kressel opine that the neutrality myth
has a negative effect on the development of mediation as a professional
217
occupation.21 As they phrase it:
This masking of pressure tactics has implications for the profession. On the one hand, we
have a myth that says mediation is noncoercive. The reality of the conflicts in which they
are engaged and the demands of their professional careers means that the impetus to use
pressure and coercion is probably inevitable. Frequently, mediators resolve the tension
through a kind of denial about what they do. The denial stands in the way of learning and
keeps the field from better understanding the uses and limits of pressure.
Despite the fact that structural coupling of impartiality and care
generally establishes neutrality as a myth and limits the participation of
disadvantaged groups through a perception of thin procedural justice, it has
the power, in my opinion, to do just the opposite. The next section will
discuss this possibility.
216. See Cobb & Rifkin, supra note 7, at 40-41. Cobb and Rifkin found in their research that
the mythical status of neutrality made it difficult for mediators to describe their practice of neutrality.
According to the researchers, mediators who seek to do so generally make use of another term,
which itself is in need of clarification: justice, power, or ideology. See id.
217. Deborah M. Kolb & Kenneth Kressel, The Realities of Making Talk Work, in WHEN TALK
WORKS: PROFILES OF MEDIATORS 459, 483 (1997).
218. Id.
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5. From Impartiality to Equal Partiality
[O]bjectivity is an achievement of democratic communication that includes all
differentiated social positions. Objectivity in political judgment ... does not consist in
discovering some truth about politics or institutions independent of the awareness and
actions of social members. But it is also not some kind of sum of their differentiated
viewpoints. 2 19
The coupling of impartiality and care not only creates a myth of
neutrality camouflaging practices of disciplinary power, but it also has the
power to create a new ethical concept that will advance principles of "thick"
procedural justice, which in turn will increase the effective participation of
parties from disadvantaged groups. For this to occur, one has to identify the
dimensions of structural coupling relations that can be characterized by
mutual challenging. More precisely, one should ask: How may the ethic of
care challenge the ethic of impartiality? 220
Young's concept of objectivity indicates the possibility of mutual
challenging. 221 According to Young, for a public sphere to be inclusive, it
must be characterized by a high level of objectivity.222 In this context,
objectivity does not mean impartiality or "view from nowhere," rather, it is
an expansion of the narrow viewpoint to contain varied points of view.223
This meaning of objectivity differs from its traditional meaning, which is
identified with the idea of impartiality. 224 Young uses an accepted concept
to generate a transformation and to impart to it a new meaning: no longer a
unified perspective, but a variety of viewpoints.225
This transformation is enabled by observing the concept of objectivity
from the prism of care. Such an observation undermines the existing
meaning of impartiality by mythifying objectivity, thereby enabling the old
vessel to be filled with new wine, a new meaning.2 2 6 The new meaning is
multipartiality or omnipartiality.227 This idea deconstructs the dichotomy
between partiality and impartiality, between subjectivity and objectivity. It
219. YOUNG, supra note 207, at 114.
220. Id. at 112.
221. Id. at ll4.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 113-14.
224. Id at 114.
225. Id.
226. Alicia Ostriker, The Thieves of Language: Women Poets and Revisionist Mythmaking, in
THE NEW FEMINIST CRITICISM, ESSAYS ON WOMEN, LITERATURE & THEORY 314, 317 (Elaine
Showalter ed., 1985) (defining "revisionist mythmaking" in the context of women poets).
227. The term "omnipartiality" was coined by Cloke. KENNETH CLOKE, MEDIATION: REVENGE
AND THE MAGIC OF FORGIVENESS 13 (1994).
500
34
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 11, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 11
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol11/iss3/11
[Vol. 11: 467, 2011]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
does not express a unilateral position, nor does it reflect impartiality in the
sense of "view from nowhere."228 It is based on an ethic of showing
partiality, but nevertheless does not express giving preference to one of the
parties. Its meaning is showing partiality in equal measure. 229
The ethic of equal partiality embodies relations of mutual challenging,
in which care undermines and changes the accepted perception of
impartiality230 so that it will cease to fulfill a function of covert power:
instead of looking from nowhere, the third party is now obliged to recognize
that she has points of view and must make a conscious effort to identify
these blind spots and reveal an openness toward new and different points of
view.231
A mediator who is committed to the ethic of equal partiality strives to
see the unique faces of the parties, listen to their life stories, make an effort
to walk in their shoes, and see events from their respective viewpoints. Such
a mediator is not interested in establishing himself as an expert in dispute
resolution,232 but is acting as a "story-taker," 233 someone who is a midwife to
the new narrative of the parties and does not give birth to any story
himself.234 The midwifery function necessitates that mediators rise above all
228. See YOUNG, supra note 207, at 113.
229. Cf BENZIMAN, supra note 54, at 123-24.
230. A similar concept of ethics appears at times in community and aboriginal dispute
resolution models that are not based on the liberal ethic of impartiality. See, e.g., Madeleine Suave,
Mediation: Toward an Aboriginal Conceptualization, 3 ABORIGINAL L. BULL. 10 (1996), available
at http://www.austlii.edu.aulau/journals/AboriginalLB/1996/26.html. On objection to the ethic of
impartiality in colonial contexts, see Sally Falk Moore, Treating Law as Knowledge: Telling
Colonial Officers What to Say to Africans About Running "Their Own" Native Courts, 26 LAW &
Soc'Y REv. 11, 35-37 (1992).
231. The notion of multipartiality is not necessarily theoretical and is manifested, for instance,
in Canadian judicial rules of ethics. ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR JUDGES 6 cmt. A.3 (Canadian Judicial
Council 1998). In R. v. R.D.S., [1997] 484 S.C.R. 3 (Can.), the judges in the minority clarified their
opinion that these rules not only allow the judge to take into consideration a discriminatory social
reality, they obligate the judge to do so even if concrete proof of discrimination is not introduced in
the specific case. In the opinion of these judges, the explicit recognition of the existence of the
social context-which, for instance, is manifested in systematic social discrimination on an ethnic
basis-expresses the absence of bias in the deepest sense: it is the meaning of multiple viewpoints
instead of the impossible meaning of the absence of perspective or of observing from nowhere. See
id. (L'Heureux-Dub, J. & McLachlin, J., dissenting).
232. JOHN WINSLADE & GERALD MONK, NARRATIVE MEDIATION: A NEW APPROACH TO
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 119 (2000) (arguing that mediators earn trust rather than assume it).
233. ADRIANA CAVARERO, RELATING NARRATIVES: STORYTELLING AND SELFHOOD 64 (2000).
234. Sally Engle Merry, Community Mediation as Community Organizing, in WHEN TALK
WORKS: PROFILES OF MEDIATORS 245, 263 (1997) (referencing Albie M. Davis, The Logic Behind
the Magic ofMediation, 5 NEGOTIATION J. 17 (1989)).
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the limitations of their perceptions and attitudes and believe that their own
narratives are in need of expansion through new viewpoints that the parties
bring to mediation.235
Adopting the aforementioned approach will assist the mediator in
helping each party to give birth, as it were, to the meanings hidden away in
their narratives, meaning that it has liberating and healing value.236
Nevertheless, the midwifery function does not conclude with listening to the
original dispute story, a story that often hides oppressive hegemonic
perceptions; the mediator must be an active partner in the composition of the
new narrative: the party cannot be the only author of her life story, for the
healing meaning of the narrative is revealed in the main through dialogue.237
Because parties find it difficult to converse at the outset of the
mediation, the mediator initiates conversation with each parties on a
individual basis.238 This process paves the way for direct dialogue between
the parties themselves. To advance such dialogue, the mediator-midwife
should try to generate reflective processes that will enable the parties to
identify the impact of hegemonic norms on the dispute story and to shake the
dichotomous and total world picture that they hold.239 In such a picture, the
parties see themselves or the other as completely good or completely bad,
"viewing the past or the future as completely dark or totally clear, seeing any
behavior as worthy only of praise or of condemnation."2 The role of the
mediator is to bring about a double view instead of the prevailing one-sided
view.241 This may be done, for example, by posing questions that will create
constructive confusion among the parties "and then, in relief.. . reframe the
issues with greater focus on the essential substantive conflict . . .. [T]he
mediator uses the stress of the circumstances or events as an opportunity to
235. Cf HAYIM OMER & NACHI ALON, THE CASE OF THE THERAPEUTIC STORY 171 (1997)
[Heb].
236. Id. at 134; Winslade & Monk, supra note 232, at 125; Mark S. Umbreit, Humanistic
Mediation: A Transformative Journey ofPeacemaking, 14 Mediation Q. 201, 202 (1997); Lois Gold,
Mediation and the Culture of Healing, in BRINGING PEACE INTO THE RooM: HOW THE PERSONAL
QUALITIES OF THE MEDIATOR IMPACT THE PROCESS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 183, 193 (Daniel
Bowling & David A. Hoffman eds., 2003) (emphasizing the value of mediator compassion); Mark S.
Umbreit, Humanistic Mediation: Peacemaking in Core Social Work Values (2002).
237. See JUDITH BUTLER, GIVING ACCOUNT OF ONESELF 84 (2005); Cavarero, supra note 233,
at 39-40, 62-63.
238. Kuttner, supra note 150, at 341.
239. PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 50 (Myra Bergman Ramos trans., 30th
anniversary ed. 2007); Isabella R. Gunning, Diversity Issues in Mediation: Controlling Negative
Cultural Myths, 15 J. DisP. RESOL. 55, 80 (1995).
240. OMER & ALON, supra note 235, at 19.
241. Id. at 19-20.
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forge a shift in perspectives." 242 The new thinking possibilities will enrich
each party's original viewpoint with new fields of meaning and create space
for a more complex narrative, one that is rich and multi-vocal. 243
This process is likely to advance expression of subversive narratives that
will challenge the hegemonic narrative and undermine it: while the ethic of
neutrality creates hidden barriers to participation that make it difficult for
such stories to pave their way to the discussion table, the ethic of equal
partiality might assist these stories in gaining attention because it prevents
the mediator from hiding behind a false distinction between process and
content and compels the mediator to take a stand on issues of social
justice.2" As Winslade, Monk, and Cotter have argued:
[M]ediators may state openly their opposition to violence, racism, sexism, or class
privilege. They seek to embody in their mediation work an overt bias toward the
promotion of social justice. Keeping these issues in the forefront of consciousness
enables, at times, the deliberate privileging of the voices of those who are usually not
listened to.245
Privileging the silenced voices means affirmative action, not giving
preference: the silenced voices are in need of the mediator's active
assistance to be heard and to gain attention.246 In contrast, narratives that
reflect the ruling viewpoint are generally thought of as self-evident and,
therefore, not in need of similar assistance. Equal partiality is intended,
then, to realize the principle of essential equality and to enable every voice,
including those who have been silenced, to receive an equal opportunity to
express oneself and to be heard. "[T]he mediator, as master storyteller, must
be able to edit the script of each disputant's story of the conflict and concoct
another scenario in which all participants can play a part in the drama."247
Affirmative action toward the silenced voices does not mean assuming a
relativistic ethical position. In fact, the silenced voices are able to reveal the
242. Robert D. Benjamin, Managing the Natural Energy of the Conflict: Mediators, Tricksters
and the Constructive Use of Deception, in BRINGING PEACE INTO THE RooM: HOW THE PERSONAL
QUALITIES OF THE MEDIATOR IMPACT THE PROCESS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 79, 96 (Daniel
Bowling & David A. Hoffman eds., 2003).
243. See id. at 85.
244. See Sara Cobb, Creating Sacred Space: Toward a Second-Generation Dispute Resolution
Practice, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1017, 1029, 1032-33 (2001).
245. John Winslade, Gerald Monk & Alison Cotter, A Narrative Approach to the Practice of
Mediation, 14 NEGOTIATION J. 21, 25 (1998) (emphasis added).
246. Id.
247. Benjamin, supra note 242, at 102.
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often unethical nature of the prevailing position precisely because it does not
fulfill general ethical principles even if it pretends to do so. These voices are
often expressed by way of "life stories": narratives that create a connection
between the specific conflict and the social structure, between local, context-
dependent justice, and general norms of justice.24 8 These narratives can
advance ethical discussion that strays from the objective of reaching an
agreement:249 through examining the ethical nature of the prevailing position
in action, in a specific context,250 they can illuminate it with new, external
points of view in a manner that transforms the familiar into something
strange. The estrangement of a self-evident norm liberates it from its
"naturalness," paving the way for its undermining and alteration.
Adopting an ethical stand of equal partiality can increase the effective
participation of parties from disadvantaged groups in mediation by
advancing a dialogue based on principles of thick procedural justice. These
principles, according to Bohman's model of dialogic democracy,25 1 include
exposing the manner in which social traditions and categories considered
natural or self-evident affect participants' narratives; deconstructing abstract
norms reflecting hegemonic categories and paving the way to their
expansion so that they can include voices from the periphery; creating a new
pluralistic interpretive framework that contains a variety of viewpoints; 25 2
and attributing importance to life stories that create a link between personal
experience and collective history.253
In the following section, I shall present the narrative mediation model
and examine whether and how it furthers a dialogue containing principles of
thick procedural justice.
248. See Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1597, 1625,
1628 (1990).
249. See Cobb, supra note 244, at 1018-19.
250. See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING As FREE SPEECH AND IT'S A GOOD
THING, Too 102 (1994); Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV.
1699, 1716 (1990); Wendy Brown, Rights and Losses, in STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM
IN LATE MODERNITY 97 (1995).
251. See JAMES BOHMAN, PUBLIC DELIBERATION: PLURALISM, COMPLEXITY, AND
DEMOCRACY 59-63, 103 (1996).
252. Id. at 92-93.
253. See Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call ofStories, 79 CAL. L. REv. 971, 1022-23 (1991).
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III. THE NARRATIVE MEDIATION MODEL
A. Introduction: The Ideology of the Narrative Model
The narrative mediation model was developed by Winslade and Monk
in their book Narrative Mediation.254 The authors were deeply influenced
by the narrative therapy method developed by Michael White and David
Epston in the early 1990s.2 55 White and Epston, followed by Winslade,
Monk, and others, sought to develop a therapeutic practice that would take
into consideration power relations in society, especially those related to
gender and to minority ethnic groups, mainly aboriginals.256
The point of departure of the narrative mediation model assumes that
disputes occurring in the private sphere are influenced by social and cultural
norms that are considered self-evident. These norms establish points of
view that create, among all of the parties, a different story pertaining to the
dispute. Therefore, a condition for constructing a new narrative of relations
between the parties is to identify these points of view and unsettle them.
The developers of this model criticized the problem-solving model,
which sees the objective of mediation as dispute resolution, based on the
needs and interests of the parties.257 In their opinion, the perception of
needs-the unsupplied needs-places the autonomous individual at the
center and diverts attention from the fact that needs are in effect a product of
social and cultural construction.258 In order for the narrative model to be
able to take power relations into consideration, it must, in their opinion, be
based on the assumption that language is performative and that it establishes
reality: words are not only a tool for representing reality; they also construct
254. WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 232. The possibility of a narrative mediation model was
mentioned but not sufficiently developed in several articles in the 1990s. See, e.g., Rifkin et al.,
supra note 5, passim.
255. See MICHAEL WHITE & DAVID EPSTON, NARRATIVE MEANS TO THERAPEUTIC ENDS
(1990).
256. See id; GERALD MONK ET AL., NARRATIVE THERAPY IN PRACTICE: THE ARCHEOLOGY OF
HOPE (1997); John Winslade, Storying Professional Identity, 4 INT'L J. NARRATIVE THERAPY &
CMTY. WORK, 2002, available at http://www.dulwichcentre.com.au/johnwinsladearticle.htm.
257. WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 232, at 31-54.
258. See David M. Engel, Origin Myths: Narratives of Authority, Resistance, Disability, and
Law, 27 LAW & Soc'y REV. 785, 789 (1993); David M. Engel, Law in the Domains of Everyday
Life: The Construction of Community and Difference, in LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE 123 (Austin Sarat
& Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1995).
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it and give it meaning.259 The narrative not only reflects dominant cultural
meanings, it also establishes them.26 These meanings are often a product of
presenting viewpoints that serve dominant interests as objective facts. 26 1 It
follows from the performative notion of language that the objective of
mediation is not to identify the needs and interests of the parties, but to
expose the hidden points of views that constitute these needs and to
undermine them.262 Identifying the various narratives creating the dispute is
the first step in building a new interpretation of the history of the dispute-
an interpretation based on alternative viewpoints, some of which had been
silenced up to now.263 Mediation that advances processes of deconstructing
dominant stories and building alternative narrations constitutes a site for
social change.26
B. Objectives of the Narrative Model: Deconstruction and Reconstruction
The goals of the narrative mediation model are deconstruction and
reconstruction-breaking down the story of the conflict and constructing an
alternative story.
The process of deconstruction is intended to undercut the logic of the
various dispute stories and reveal the viewpoints that established them. The
undermining process paves the way for replacing the narrow and partial
narrative of the original dispute story with a new story containing alternate
themes of relationships that were either swallowed up within the various
conflict stories or that disappeared because they did not accord with the
dominant theme. The function of the narrative mediator is to locate the
untold experiences that did not find their way into the conflict story and
rescue them by integrating them into the new story. The new narrative
embodies an expansion of the conflict stories: it is a narrative that contains
new themes alongside those that remained from the original conflict
stories.265 The processes of deconstruction and reconstruction are not linear
but intertwined, one created within the other.
To advance these processes of deconstruction and reconstruction,
Winslade and Monk propose that the mediator make use of what they term
259. WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 232, at 3.
260. Id. at 40-41.
261. Id. at 3.
262. Id. at 40-41.
263. Id. at 38-39.
264. Id. at 40-41.
265. Id. at 56.
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"dialogic practices." 266 These are characterized by adopting an inquisitive
stance. 267  The mediator, in their opinion, does not have to convince the
parties what is right for them, but should present them with questions
inviting new interpretations and meanings. The objective of these questions
is to engender a reflective process that will assist the parties in
understanding how the position that they are taking affects the manner in
which they perceive both the dispute and the other party, and what the
relationship is between this position and accepted social perceptions.268 The
reflective process may assist the parties in identifying the covert healing
meanings hiding in their narrative.
The central practice of the narrative model is externalizing the problem.
This is intended to aid in deconstructing dominant categories and in
identifying the manner in which accepted perceptions and universal truths
influence the dispute, as well as establish it:
The externalization of the problem helps persons identify and separate from unitary
knowledges and "truth" discourses that are subjugating in them. In mapping the
influence of the problem in the person's life and relationships, these unitary knowledges
can be exposed by encouraging persons to identify beliefs about themselves [and] others
and their relationships that are reinforced and confirmed by the continued presence of the
problem.270
According to White and Epston, encouraging narrators to reveal aspects
of their stories that have been silenced can open up new meanings that will
enable their extrication from the restricted position that the dominant story
forced on them.27'
The dialogic practices of the narrative model are exemplified in
Winslade and Monk's book.272 The first chapter contains a description of
the mediation of a custody dispute between Fiona and Greg, a couple in the
process of divorce. In court, each side demanded exclusive custody of the
children. At the start of the mediation, the couple presented positions
characterized by an uncompromising and total narrative: husband and wife
attributed to each other full guilt and responsibility for the dispute. The
mediator sought to expose the points of view that constituted the total
266. Id. at 125-26.
267. Id.
268. WHITE & EPSTON, supra note 255, at 30.
269. See id.; OMER & ALON, supra note 235, at 133.
270. WHITE & EPSTON, supra note 255, at 30.
271. Id. at 15.
272. WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 232, at 1-30.
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narrative, and toward that end presented questions to each party, in the
context of the individual meetings, that were intended to map the social and
cultural norms that impacted each one's dispute narrative.273
At first, the mediator asked Fiona to detail her opinions about marriage
in general and her expectations of marriage to Greg in particular. Fiona
related that in the initial period of their marriage, a kind of silent agreement
existed between her and Greg to the effect that Greg would see to providing
for the family and she would bear responsibility for tending to the house and
rearing the children.274 This division of tasks was modeled, in her words, by
their parents.275 In the next stage, the mediator examined her attitude toward
social and cultural norms that influenced the traditional gendered pattern of
the division of tasks in the family.2 76 Fiona expressed deep regret that she
had not expressed more assertiveness in relation to her own needs and
aspirations and voiced the feeling that she had sacrificed herself for the sake
of caring for the family, while giving up a career of her own and the
development of an independent economic capability.277
According to Winslade and Monk's analysis, Fiona's narrative revealed
several dominant cultural norms that served as the territory from which the
conflict sprang, among them the woman's role is submissively fulfilling the
needs of her husband; the husband's achievement being her principal source
of satisfaction and enjoyment; the woman being responsible for her
children's and her husband's social and emotional needs; and the woman
having to concede aspirations for a career of her own.278
Greg's story was characterized by a total narrative that ascribes to Fiona
full responsibility for his suffering. 279 The mediator sought to deconstruct
this narrative and to reframe the description, "Fiona is the problem," with an
alternative description that related to relations between the couple and to the
effects of the dispute on Greg and on the children. 280 To this end, he made
use of the technique of externalizing the problem, a technique that is meant
to enable a deconstruction of the total unyielding theme and its conversion to
alternatives that would turn the problem into a kind of third party, external to
the two parties themselves.2 8' The alternative themes that were rescued from
Greg's narrative were neglect, betrayal, lack of trust, and pain-themes that
273. Id.
274. Id. at 13-14.
275. Id. at 16.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 7.
280. Id.
281. Id.
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expressed the effects of the dispute and its consequences for the two parties
without attributing guilt to anyone.282
At the next stage, the mediator wanted to map the effects of the conflict
on Greg. The latter was asked, among other things, how the conflict had
impacted his health and how the growing absence of trust between him and
Fiona affected their children.283 These queries clarified the dominant
discursive themes that affected Greg, in particular that of the man as head of
the family and exclusive decision maker. 84 Other themes were derived from
that particular theme, such as bearing the yoke of provider is the man's
central contribution to his family, a good husband is a man who makes a
good living, and a woman who leaves her husband betrays the family and
loses every right to make decisions pertaining to raising the children. 2 5 To
attempt to deconstruct the discursive category of "family head," the mediator
asked Greg how the norm of "a good provider is a man who makes a good
living" influences him. 2 86 Greg expressed his feeling that this norm imposed
a heavy physical and mental burden on him, stating that he had already
started to reduce his working hours to spend more time with his children.287
By deconstructing the discursive themes that constituted the couple's
viewpoints of the dispute, the mediator was trying to further the process of
building a new narrative that would replace the original total narrative. The
path of building the new story was paved by integrating the children's voices
in the process. 288  According to Winslade and Monk's analysis, the
children's participation in mediation brought about a stop to their serving as
an object in their parents' discourse and led to their becoming a subject with
a voice of their own.289 Giving weight to the children's voices also led to a
change in Fiona's and Greg's position both on the matter of their children
and in regard to themselves.290 Greg understood for the first time that the
children had clear opinions and desires that contrasted with his, an
understanding that created an opening to building new relations with
282. Id.
283. Id. at 16.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 20.
287. Id. at 22.
288. Id.
289. Id
290. Id
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Fiona.29 ' He came to see that his struggle to obtain custody of the children
stemmed to a great extent from the desire to punish his wife for her decision
to end the marriage.292 With discovery of the first signs of abandoning the
authoritative patriarchal position, there was a change, too, in Fiona's attitude
toward Greg, and she began to show greater empathy toward him.293
C. Criticism of the Narrative Model
The theory and practice of the narrative mediation model turned it, in
my opinion, into a mediation model with the most significant potential for
furthering participation based on principles of thick procedural justice.
Nonetheless, and despite its innovation, the model is deficient in two main
conceptual aspects: a one-dimensional perception of needs and the absence
of an alternative to the ethic of neutrality.
1. One-Dimensional Perception of Needs
The narrative model sharply criticizes the perception of needs that lies at
the heart of the problem-solving model. This criticism is based on an
inexact and one-sided presentation of the idea of needs, the objective of
which apparently is to sharpen opposition between the two models and to
highlight the innovativeness of the narrative model. Thus, for example,
Winslade and Monk argue that men's need for a career-a need frequently
expressed in divorce disputes-is a socially constructed need influenced by
a patriarchal sense of entitlement to being "head of the family."294
This so-called need is an example of a term that in the problem-solving
model might be interpreted as a position, not a need. A mediator who acts
according to the problem-solving model might have attempted to reveal
needs hidden behind this position through posing open-ended questions,
such as why the narrator's career is important to him, how in his opinion
career and spending time with the children can be balanced, and so forth.
Such questions strive to reveal the various points of view that establish the
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. See generally John Winslade, Mediation with a Focus on Discursive Positioning (2003),
http://narrative-mediation.crinfo.org/documents/mini-
grants/narrativemediation/Mediationwith aFocus.pdf, John Winslade Narrative Mediation:
Assisting in the Renegotiation of Discursive Positions, Keynote Presentation at the Dulwich Centre
International Summer School (Nov. 19, 2003), available at http://narrative-
mediation.crinfo.org/documents/mini-
grants/narrative-mediation/RenegotiatingDiscursivePositions.pdf.
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narrator's position on the subject of career, including viewpoints that are
created by the dominant discourse.
In the mediation involving Fiona and Greg, for example, mapping the
discursive themes that affected Fiona also exposed her needs, which
included: development of economic independence, equal partnership in
family decision-making, equality in the division of responsibility for the
household, and rearing the children.2 95 Mapping of the dominant norms also
revealed Greg's needs, such as limiting the number of working hours and
spending more time with the children.2  Greg's and Fiona's needs partially
overlap, which might pave the way to an agreement that integrates their
needs. 9 7  Understanding needs to be a by-product of deconstructing
positions, rather than a fixed entity determined in advance, brings the
problem-solving model closer to the narrative model.
However, though I have reservations about the narrative model's
criticism of the perception of needs, it is my opinion that the perception of
needs in the problem-solving model may indeed make it difficult to further
the effective participation of parties from disadvantaged groups. The reason,
as I see it, is that it is quite difficult to translate a party's personal story into
a list of needs, and attempts to do so may cause the narrative to lose its
uniqueness. Thus, for instance, symbolic values that are incommensurable
with rational expression or empirical justification, such as the narrator's
identity, special history, morality, feelings, desires, and so on, might be
perceived as not containing needs relevant to the settling of a dispute, and so
they often undergo filtering from the agenda.298
It follows from this criticism that in order for the perception of needs to
be able to advance the effective participation of parties from disadvantaged
groups, it must be revised in a way that needs will constitute an outcome of
the undermining of hegemonic categories. In other words, the process of
identifying needs has to be integrated with the exposing of the relationship
between the personal narrative and the political, cultural, and social
structure. The needs that are identified in such a process will include, almost
certainly, not only the personal or psychological needs of the autonomous
individual, but also needs that result from gender, cultural, ethnic, or
295. See WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 232, at 1-30.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. See Cobb, supra note 244, at 1019-20; Wendy Espeland, Legally Mediated Identity: The
National Environmental Policy Act and the Bureaucratic Construction ofInterests, 28 LAW & SoC'Y
REV. 1149, 1165-66 (1994).
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national belonging. Narratives that express such needs may connect
procedural justice to perceptions of universal justice and thereby illuminate
the lack of morality of so-called self-evident dominant norms.
2. Absence of an Adequate Alternative to the Ethic of Neutrality
Unlike the problem-solving model's perception of neutrality, which
strives to minimize the mediator's effect on content, the narrative model
views this effect as desirable:2 99 processes of deconstruction and
reconstruction occur through integrating the mediator's viewpoints with
those of the parties. In the narrative model, the mediator is an active partner
in composing the new narrative. This partnership is manifested in the
process of midwifery, which is intended to encourage the parties to identify
the influence of dominant norms on their dispute stories and to create an
alternative narrative that challenges these norms. A narrative mediator is,
then, one who possesses political and social awareness.
This perception of the role of the mediator manifests a postmodern
philosophy that denies the notion of impartiality. As I have argued in the
previous sections, impartiality is based on a unified perspective of "view
from nowhere" that avoids differences between the parties and the effects of
power relations on their narratives.oo Such a stand does not accord with
processes of deconstruction and reconstruction that connect agent with
structure, the small narrative of the narrator with the large-scale narratives of
the social structure.30'
Nevertheless, and in contrast to what may have been expected, Winslade
and Monk show ambivalence toward the idea of neutrality; despite their
reservations, they do not explicitly renounce it nor do they offer an
alternative.302 This situation leaves narrative mediators without ethical
guidelines as to how they should contend with power gaps in the mediation:
on the one hand, in recognizing the existence of discursive dominant
perceptions structured by the discourse, it is the mediator's obligation to take
power relations into consideration. On the other hand, in the absence of an
alternative ethic to neutrality, it might be difficult to institute practices that
299. Cobb, supra note 244, at 1028-29.
300. See YOUNG, supra note 207, at 113.
301. Boaventura De Sousa Santos, The Postmodern Transition: Law and Politics, in THE FATE
OF LAW 79, 105, 114-17 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1991); PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN
SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE 47-48 (1998); Nancy Fraser
& Linda Nicholson, Social Criticism without Philosophy: An Encounter Between Feminism and
Postmodernism, in UNIVERSAL ABANDON? THE POLITICS OF POSTMODERNISM 83, 88-89, 100-102
(Andrew Ross ed., 1989).
302. WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 232, at 50.
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deal with power gaps. Such practices should be derived from a theoretical
conception, but no such theory exists.
The difficulty in developing an alternative ethical conception to that of
neutrality causes Winslade and Monk to base the theory of the narrative
model on a problematic perception of power that does not accord with the
objective of the model.30 Relying on Foucault's approach to power, they
adopt a subversive concept of power that refrains from connecting the small,
local narrative of the narrator with large narratives of social structure. 304
They claim that since power relations are created and challenged continually
by the discourse during mediation, everyone-including those located on the
periphery of society-can object to power relationships, and every
participant can become an agent.305 Thus, they arrive at the conclusion that
it is not the function of the mediator to balance power gaps or to advance
empowerment processes, for the notion of empowerment does not fit with
the perception of subversive power originating in discourse.306 Instead of
empowerment, it is more proper, in their opinion, to examine the manner in
which people exploit opportunities to object to power.307
Adopting Foucault's earlier concept of power without taking into
consideration the criticism lodged against it creates a split between local
subversiveness and hegemony, between agent and structure.30s This concept
of power and empowerment does not agree with the objective of the model,
which is to advance processes of deconstructing hegemonic narratives and
reconstructing a new interpretive framework. A local subversive story may,
for a moment, undercut the original conflict story, but the deconstruction
will be tactical, not strategic, because it will not succeed in relating the local
subversiveness of individuals to the political and social structure.
Furthermore, the model's theory of power does not agree with practices
of deconstruction and reconstruction exemplified previously. Whereas the
theory of the model negates every type of essentiality connected with large
303. Id.at41-51.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 49-51.
307. Id.
308. See, e.g., Peter Fitzpatrick, Law and Societies, 22 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 115, 122 (1984);
Stuart Henry, Community Justice, Capitalist Society, and Human Agency: The Dialectics of
Collective Law in the Cooperative, 19 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 303-04, 307 (1985); Hunt, supra note
180, at 32; Susan Silbey, Making a Place for Cultural Analysis ofLaw, 17 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 39,
46-48 (1992).
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narratives, it appears from the example of the Fiona and Greg mediation that
the narrative mediator assists the parties in deconstructing big hegemonic
narratives and in identifying the manner in which the parties affect their
points of view in relation to the dispute.
There exists, then, a gap between the ideology and practice of the
model. The ideology is based on a radical, postmodern perception of power
that does not recognize the existence of social structures. In contrast, the
reality of mediation practices portray the mediator as having a social and
political awareness that recognizes big power structures and strives to reveal
their influence on the dispute through an ethic of equal partiality. This gap
may limit the empowering potential of the model in the context of parties
coming from disadvantaged groups.
To intensify the model's empowering potential, there is a need for a
theory based on an ethic of equal partiality and a concept of power that
recognizes the connection between small narratives and large narratives.
Development of such a theory may be crucial in disputes between a
dominant group and a culturally or socially disadvantaged group. Even
though narrative mediation practices manage to deal relatively successfully
with large-scale narratives of gender that appear in family disputes within
the same cultural group, the absence of such theoretical development may
make it difficult to cope effectively with large narratives that appear in
polycentric disputes between various social and cultural groups. The
narratives that appear in disputes of this sort differ from those of gender;
whereas the woman, as Simone de Beauvoir argues, is perceived as a close
"other,"3a the social, cultural, or ethnic other group is considered a distant
other. This is especially so if the ruling group shapes its identity on the basis
of denigrating the other.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this article, I have examined whether the concept of the mediator's
neutrality advances the effective participation of parties who come from
disadvantaged groups. I argue that the self-evident status that the mediator's
neutrality has gained is a product of the proximity between mediator's
neutrality and judicial impartiality, creating a myth of neutrality with two
dimensions: impartiality and a duty of trust that is reminiscent in character
of the duty imposed on professionals. Continuous tension exists between the
two dimensions of neutrality. Whereas impartiality entails preserving equal
distance and demonstrating equal relations toward both parties without
regard to their personalities and preferences, the necessity for gaining the
309. SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 35-69 (H. M. Parshley trans., 1949).
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parties' trust involves creating a personal relationship between the mediator
and the parties, especially in the course of caucuses.
The two models of mediation attempt to settle the tension between these
two aspects differently. The problem-solving model aspires to assign the
mediator's role to "process" only and to leave full responsibility for the
outcome or for the content in the hands of the parties. The problematic
distinction between process and content-a product of the integration of
principles of democratic participation with principles of adversarial-
competitive participation-causes the mediator's neutrality to aspire, on the
one hand, to advance a democratic process that leaves sovereignty of
outcome in the hands of the parties, and on the other hand, to advance as
close as possible to the model of judicial impartiality, which manifests a
third party's wielding of covert power.
Alternatively, the transformative mediation model seeks to free itself of
the distinction between process and content and, instead, adopts a no less
problematic concept of radical neutrality, which is mainly grounded in the
notion of impartiality-a notion that does not accord with the objective of
empowerment and recognition.
It is my thesis that the tension between the two aspects of neutrality
creates a myth of neutrality, since it embodies relations of structural
coupling between two different ethical concepts: the concept of impartiality
and the concept of care. The former ethic reflects objective justice and
fairness, and it is manifested in a passive and distant stance and in the
attempt to observe the dispute and the parties to it from behind a veil of
ignorance or from a position of nowhere. In contrast, the ethic of care
means responsibility toward the parties and concern for their needs; it is
expressed in attitudes of empathy, involvement, understanding, and support.
Impartiality necessitates a distinction between process and content, whereas
care may obligate intervention by a third party, the mediator, in the content
of the dispute.
The duality of the affinity to law and of the opposition to law establishes
mediation as a regulatory site, in which mediation is simultaneously
established as a democratic arena, where the individual participants are
responsible, free, and autonomous, and as a competitive process run in the
shadow of the law, which is intended to grant legitimacy and to constitute all
who practice mediation as possessing a quality of neutrality. This duality
establishes neutrality as a myth and masks the power that is at work in
mediation, harming the effective participation of the parties, especially if
they come from disadvantaged groups.
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Despite the fact that structural coupling between impartiality and care
acts to establish mediation as a site in which disciplinary power is executed,
it is my contention that it has the power to work in an opposite fashion. This
may be done by observing the concept of impartiality from within the prism
of care. Such an observation undermines the significance of "view from
nowhere" by pouring new meaning-multipartiality or omnipartiality-into
the old vessel.3 0 This new meaning deconstructs the dichotomy between
care and impartiality and creates a new ethical concept: equal partiality.
The ethic of equal partiality embodies relations of mutual challenge
between impartiality and care. The mediator is no longer an expert
observing the dispute from nowhere, but is obliged to acknowledge his
personal point of view and to show openness toward new viewpoints that are
different from his opinion. Such a mediator aspires to see the unique faces
of all participants, to listen to their personal stories, and to encourage a
process of reflective narration that will enrich each party's original story
with new meanings. This process may advance a dialogue that embodies
principles of thick procedural justice, because it has the power to enable the
stories of parties from disadvantaged groups, who up to now have not gained
attention, to pave their way, perhaps for the first time, to the discussion
table.
Finally, I presented the narrative mediation model and examined
whether it is capable of furthering dialogic participation embodying
principles of thick procedural justice. I argued that the narrative model is
the only mediation model that viewed life stories and other forms of
subversive stories as the very heart of the process. Nevertheless, two
conceptual problems may stand in the way. First, its tendentious criticism of
the perception of needs, which does not take into account the possibility that
a solution based on needs may fulfill an empowerment function; second, its
absence of an alternative ethic to neutrality. I proposed tightening the
connection between theory and practice by adopting an ethical concept of
equal partiality and grounding the model on a broader theory of power that
recognizes the relationship between local power and the social and political
structure. Such a theoretical repair might be crucial in polycentric disputes,
in which different cultural, ethnic, and social groups are involved.
Despite its faults, the narrative mediation model, in my opinion,
demonstrates that the possibility of an empowering dialogue administered by
a mediator possessing social awareness is not a wild dream. Such mediators
need not enjoy exceptional theoretical capabilities, even though they must
undergo training different from that of mediators who operate according to
the problem-solving model or the transformative model. Training for this
310. See YOUNG, supra note 207, at 113.
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kind of mediation should include a basic study of the concept of hegemony,
an understanding of the meaning of equal partiality, and practical exercises
in deconstruction and reconstruction."' The development of mediator
training programs in this spirit harbors significant empowerment potential
for parties from disadvantaged groups.
311. For a recommendation on training in this spirit, see Gunning, supra note 14, at 86-87.
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